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Preventing Economists' Capture

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  • Zingales, Luigi

Abstract

The very same forces that induce economists to conclude that regulators are captured should lead us to conclude that the economic profession is captured as well. As evidence of this capture, I show that papers whose conclusions are pro-management are more likely to be published in economic journals and more likely to be cited. I also show that business schools? faculty write papers that are more pro management. I highlight possible remedies to reduce the extent of this capture: from a reform of the publication process, to an enhanced data disclosure, from a stronger theoretical foundation to a mechanism of peer pressure. Ultimately, the most important remedy, however, is awareness, an awareness most economists still do not have.

Suggested Citation

  • Zingales, Luigi, 2014. "Preventing Economists' Capture," CEPR Discussion Papers 9867, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9867
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hilton, George W, 1972. "The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 47-54, May.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    3. Akerlof George A & Kranton Rachel, 2010. "Identity Economics," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1-3, June.
    4. Ernesto Dal Bo & Rafael Di Tella, 2003. "Capture by Threat," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1123-1152, October.
    5. Clare Leaver, 2009. "Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 572-607, June.
    6. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shapira, Roy & Zingales, Luigi, 2017. "Is Pollution Value-Maximizing? The DuPont Case," Working Papers 268, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    2. Garry Gray & Benjamin van Rooij, 2021. "Regulatory disempowerment: How enabling and controlling forms of power obstruct citizen‐based regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 800-821, July.
    3. Ernest Aigner & Florentin Gloetzl & Matthias Aistleitner & Jakob Kapeller, 2018. "The focus of academic economics: before and after the crisis," ICAE Working Papers 75, Johannes Kepler University, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capture; Economics profession; Regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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