Complementing Bagehot: Illiquidity and insolvency resolution
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- Jon Frost, 2015. "A theory of bazookas; or, "when (and when not) to use large-scale official sector support"," DNB Working Papers 479, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Nijskens, Rob, 2014. "A sheep in wolf’s clothing: Can a central bank appear tougher than it is?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 94-103.
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More about this item
Keywords
Bailout; Bank regulation; Capital; Lender of last resort; Liquidity;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2011-10-22 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2011-10-22 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CIS-2011-10-22 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-MAC-2011-10-22 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2011-10-22 (Monetary Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-10-22 (Regulation)
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