IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/8285.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Fragile States and Development Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Persson, Torsten
  • Besley, Tim

Abstract

It is widely recognized that fragile states are key symptoms of under-development in many parts of the world. Such states are incapable of delivering basic services to their citizens and political violence is commonplace. As of yet, mainstream development economics has not dealt in any systematic way with such concerns and the implications for development assistance. This paper puts forward a framework for analyzing fragile states and applies it to a variety of development policies in different types of states.

Suggested Citation

  • Persson, Torsten & Besley, Tim, 2011. "Fragile States and Development Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 8285, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8285
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP8285
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1218-1244, September.
    2. Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 381-402, April.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4354 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Mr. Sanjeev Gupta & Ms. Catherine A Pattillo & Ms. Smita Wagh, 2006. "Are Donor Countries Giving More or Less Aid?," IMF Working Papers 2006/001, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Acemoglu, Daron, 2005. "Politics and economics in weak and strong states," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1199-1226, October.
    7. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-84, February.
    8. Mark McGillivray, 2006. "Aid Allocation and Fragile States," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2006-01, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    9. Sanjeev Gupta & Catherine Pattillo & Smita Wagh, 2006. "Are Donor Countries Giving More or Less Aid?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(3), pages 535-552, August.
    10. Duflo, Esther & Glennerster, Rachel & Kremer, Michael, 2008. "Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit," Handbook of Development Economics, in: T. Paul Schultz & John A. Strauss (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 61, pages 3895-3962, Elsevier.
    11. Robert H. Bates, 2008. "The Logic of State Failure: Learning from Late-Century Africa," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 25(4), pages 297-314, September.
    12. Simeon Djankov & Jose Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2008. "The curse of aid," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 169-194, September.
    13. Lisa Chauvet & Paul Collier, 2006. "Helping Hand ? Aid to Failing States," Working Papers DT/2006/14, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
    14. Paul Collier & V. L. Elliott & Håvard Hegre & Anke Hoeffler & Marta Reynal-Querol & Nicholas Sambanis, 2003. "Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13938.
    15. Bauer, P. T., 1975. "N.H. Stern on substance and method in development economics," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 387-405, December.
    16. William Easterly, 2003. "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 23-48, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
    2. Temple, Jonathan R.W., 2010. "Aid and Conditionality," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4415-4523, Elsevier.
    3. Kilby, Christopher, 2005. "World Bank lending and regulation," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 384-407, December.
    4. Axel Dreher & Jenny Simon & Justin Valasek, 2021. "Optimal decision rules in multilateral aid funds," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 689-719, July.
    5. Dreher, Axel & Simon, Jenny & Valasek, Justin, 2018. "The Political Economy of Multilateral Aid Funds," CEPR Discussion Papers 13297, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Buntaine, Mark T., 2011. "Does the Asian Development Bank Respond to Past Environmental Performance when Allocating Environmentally Risky Financing?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 336-350, March.
    7. Annen, Kurt & Knack, Stephen, 2018. "On the delegation of aid implementation to multilateral agencies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 295-305.
    8. Scholl, Almuth, 2005. "Aid effectiveness and limited enforceable conditionality," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2005-054, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    9. Magesan, Arvind, 2013. "Human Rights Treaty Ratification of Aid Receiving Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 175-188.
    10. Almuth Scholl, 2009. "Aid Effectiveness and Limited Enforceable Conditionality," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 12(2), pages 377-391, April.
    11. Altaghlibi, Moutaz & Wagener, Florian, 2019. "Unconditional aid and green growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 158-181.
    12. Alok Kumar, 2014. "Samaritan's Dilemma, Time-Inconsistency and Foreign Aid: A Review of Theoretical Models," Department Discussion Papers 1405, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    13. Sharri Byron, 2012. "Examining Foreign Aid Fungibility in Small Open Economies," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 675-712, September.
    14. Kilby, Christopher, 2005. "Aid and regulation," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 325-345, May.
    15. Candel-Sánchez Francisco, 2014. "Incentives for Conditional Aid Effectiveness," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 75-102, June.
    16. Lauren E. Lopez, 2015. "Corruption And International Aid Allocation: A Complex Dance," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 40(1), pages 35-61, March.
    17. Liya Palagashvili & Claudia R. Williamson, 2021. "Grading foreign aid agencies: Best practices across traditional and emerging donors," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 654-676, May.
    18. Dreher, Axel & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Thiel, Susann & Thiele, Rainer, 2010. "Aid allocation by German NGOs: Does the degree of public refinancing matter?," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 92, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    19. Gaoussou Diarra, 2011. "Aid unpredictability and absorptive capacity: analyzing disbursement delays in Africa," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(1), pages 1004-1017.
    20. Alok Kumar, 2017. "Foreign Aid, Incentives and Efficiency: Can Foreign Aid Lead to the Efficient Level of Investment?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 678-697, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    State fragility; Development;

    JEL classification:

    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • P45 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - International Linkages

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8285. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.