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Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents

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  • Harhoff, Dietmar
  • Graham, Stuart J.H.

Abstract

This paper assesses the impact of adopting a post-grant review institution in the US patent system by comparing the ?opposition careers? of European Patent Office (EPO) equivalents of litigated US patents to those of a control group of EPO patents. We demonstrate several novel methods of "twinning" US and European patents and investigate the implications of employing these different methods in our data analysis. We find that EPO equivalents of US litigated patent applications are more likely to be awarded EPO patent protection than are equivalents of unlitigated patents, and the opposition rate for EPO equivalents of US litigated patents is about three times higher than for equivalents of unlitigated patents. Patents attacked under European opposition are shown to be either revoked completely or narrowed in about 70 percent of all cases. For EPO equivalents of US litigated patents, the appeal rate against opposition outcomes is considerably higher than for control-group patents. Based on our estimates, we calculate a range of net welfare benefits that would accrue from adopting a post-grant review system. Our results provide strong evidence that the United States could benefit substantially from adopting an administrative post-grant patent review, provided that the post-grant mechanism is not too costly

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  • Harhoff, Dietmar & Graham, Stuart J.H., 2006. "Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents," CEPR Discussion Papers 5680, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5680
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    Cited by:

    1. Nils Omland, 2011. "Valuing Patents through Indicators," Chapters, in: Federico Munari & Raffaele Oriani (ed.), The Economic Valuation of Patents, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Neuhäusler, Peter, 2008. "Patente in Europa und den USA: Veränderungen ab 1991 aufgezeigt an Gesamtzahlen und dem Technologiefeld des Ubiquitous Computing," Discussion Papers "Innovation Systems and Policy Analysis" 14, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI).
    3. Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2008. "The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(5), pages 982-997, May.
    4. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2011. "The puzzle of patent value indicators," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(1), pages 33-62.
    5. Malwina Mejer & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2012. "Economic incongruities in the European patent system," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 215-234, August.
    6. Siebert, Ralph Bernd & Graevenitz, Georg von, 2010. "Licensing in the Patent Thicket - Timing and Benefits," MPRA Paper 24007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Lei, Zhen & Wright, Brian D., 2009. "Why weak patents? Rational ignorance or pro-"customer" Tilt?," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49279, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    8. Catalina Martínez, 2011. "Patent families: When do different definitions really matter?," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 86(1), pages 39-63, January.
    9. Jurriën Bakker & Dennis Verhoeven & Lin Zhang & Bart Van Looy, 2016. "Patent citation indicators: One size fits all?," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 106(1), pages 187-211, January.
    10. Rockett, Katharine, 2010. "Property Rights and Invention," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 315-380, Elsevier.
    11. Olof Ejermo, 2009. "Regional Innovation Measured by Patent Data—Does Quality Matter?," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(2), pages 141-165.
    12. Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2011. "The quality factor in patent systems," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 20(6), pages 1755-1793, December.
    13. Filitz, Rainer & Henkel, Joachim & Tether, Bruce S., 2015. "Protecting aesthetic innovations? An exploration of the use of registered community designs," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(6), pages 1192-1206.
    14. de Saint-Georges, Matthis & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2013. "A quality index for patent systems," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 704-719.
    15. Andreas Panagopoulos & In-Uck Park, 2008. "Patent Protection, Takeovers, and Startup Innovation: A Dynamic Approach," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/201, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    16. Andrew Eckert & Corinne Langinier, 2014. "A Survey Of The Economics Of Patent Systems And Procedures," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 996-1015, December.
    17. Fiona Murray & Siobhán O'Mahony, 2007. "Exploring the Foundations of Cumulative Innovation: Implications for Organization Science," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(6), pages 1006-1021, December.
    18. Rahul RK Kapoor & Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2016. "The laws of action and reaction: on determinants of patent disputes in European chemical and drug industries," Working Papers TIMES² WP 2016-019, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    19. Alfons Palangkaraya, 2010. "Patent Application Databases," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 43(1), pages 77-87, March.
    20. Malwina Mejer & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2012. "Economic incongruities in the European patent system," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 215-234, August.
    21. Catherine Beaudry & Andrea Schiffauerova, 2011. "Is Canadian intellectual property leaving Canada? A study of nanotechnology patenting," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 36(6), pages 665-679, December.
    22. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2009. "From patent renewals to applications survival: do portfolio management strategies play a role in patent length?," Working Papers CEB 09-028.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    23. Katrin Cremers & Paula Schliessler, 2015. "Patent litigation settlement in Germany: why parties settle during trial," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 185-208, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Litigation; Opposition; Post-grant review; Patent system;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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