IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/3443.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Ticket Pricing Under Demand Uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Courty, Pascal

Abstract

This Paper studies a monopolist selling tickets to consumers who learn new information about their demands over time. The monopolist can sell early to uninformed consumers and/or close to the event date to informed ones, it can ration tickets and allow ticket holders to resell. I show that rationing and intertemporal sales are never optimal. More surprisingly, the monopolist cannot do strictly better by allowing resale despite the fact that consumers are willing to pay more when they can resell tickets. I discuss the implications of the model for the pricing practices observed in ticket markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Courty, Pascal, 2002. "Ticket Pricing Under Demand Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 3443, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3443
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP3443
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Clay, Karen B & Sibley, David S & Srinagesh, Padmanabhan, 1992. "Ex Post vs. Ex Ante Pricing: Optional Calling Plans and Tapered Tariffs," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 115-138, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin, 2012. "Informing consumers about their own preferences," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 417-428.
    2. Miravete, Eugenio J., 2011. "Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 479-490.
    3. Benjamin A. Olken & Patrick Barron, 2009. "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(3), pages 417-452, June.
    4. Michael Kremer, Christopher M. Snyder & Christopher M. Snyder, 2013. "When Is Prevention More Profitable than Cure? The Impact of Time-Varying Consumer Heterogeneity - Working Paper 334," Working Papers 334, Center for Global Development.
    5. Michael Kremer & Christopher M. Snyder, 2013. "When Is Prevention More Profitable than Cure? The Impact of Time-Varying Consumer Heterogeneity," Working Paper 70726, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    6. Fabian Herweg & Konrad Mierendorff, 2013. "Uncertain Demand, Consumer Loss Aversion, And Flat-Rate Tariffs," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 399-432, April.
    7. Michael Kremer & Christopher Snyder, 2013. "When is Prevention More Profitable than Cure?," CID Working Papers 252, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    8. Adib Bagh & Hemant K. Bhargava, 2013. "How to Price Discriminate When Tariff Size Matters," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(1), pages 111-126, August.
    9. Miravete, Eugenio, 2000. "Choosing the Wrong Calling Plan? Ignorance, Learning, and Risk Aversion," CEPR Discussion Papers 2562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Miravete, Eugenio J, 1996. "Screening Consumers through Alternative Pricing Mechanisms," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 111-132, March.
    11. Shy, Oz, 2008. "Measuring the cost of making payment decisions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2411-2416, December.
    12. Marco Battaglini, 2005. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 637-658, June.
    13. Barth, Anne-Kathrin & Graf, Julia, 2011. "Irrationality rings! - Experimental evidence on mobile tariff choices," DICE Discussion Papers 36, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    14. Michael Kremer & Christopher M. Snyder, 2015. "Preventives Versus Treatments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(3), pages 1167-1239.
    15. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2002. "Estimating Demand for Local Telephone Service with Asymmetric Information and Optional Calling Plans," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(4), pages 943-971.
    16. Banshwar, Anuj & Sharma, Naveen Kumar & Sood, Yog Raj & Shrivastava, Rajnish, 2018. "An international experience of technical and economic aspects of ancillary services in deregulated power industry: Lessons for emerging BRIC electricity markets," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 774-801.
    17. Anja Lambrecht & Bernd Skiera, 2006. "Ursachen eines Flatrate-Bias — Systematisierung und Messung der Einflussfaktoren," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(5), pages 588-617, August.
    18. Gérard P. Cachon & Pnina Feldman, 2011. "Pricing Services Subject to Congestion: Charge Per-Use Fees or Sell Subscriptions?," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 13(2), pages 244-260, June.
    19. Michael Kremer & Christopher Snyder, 2004. "Why is There No AIDS Vaccine?," CID Working Papers 111, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    20. Richard J. Zeckhauser & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, 2008. "Schedule Selection by Agents: from Price Plans to Tax Tables," 2008 Meeting Papers 406, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ticket pricing; Resale; Price discrimination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3443. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.