IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/19149.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

International Policy Coordination in a Multisectoral Model of Trade and Health Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Acharya, Viral
  • Jiang, Zhengyang
  • Richmond, Robert
  • von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig

Abstract

We analyze international trade and health policy coordination during a pandemic by developing a two-economy, two-sector trade model integrated into a micro-founded SIR model of infection dynamics. Disease transmission intensity can differ by goods (manufactured versus services and domestic versus foreign). Governments can adopt containment policies to suppress infection spread domestically, and levy import tariffs to prevent infection from abroad. The globally coordinated policy dynamically adjusts both policy instruments heterogeneously across sectors. The more-infected country aggressively contains the pandemic, raising tariffs and tilting the terms of trade in its favor, while the less-infected country lowers tariffs to share its economic pain. In contrast, in the Nash equilibrium of uncoordinated policies the more infected country does not internalize the global spread of the pandemic, lowering tariffs and its terms of trade, especially in the contact-intensive services sector, while the less infected country counters the spread by raising tariffs. Coordination therefore matters: the health-cum-trade war leads to less consumption and production, as well as smaller health gains due to inadequate global diversification of infection curves.

Suggested Citation

  • Acharya, Viral & Jiang, Zhengyang & Richmond, Robert & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2024. "International Policy Coordination in a Multisectoral Model of Trade and Health Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 19149, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19149
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP19149
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moll, Benjamin & Kaplan, Greg & Violante, Giovanni, 2020. "The Great Lockdown and the Big Stimulus: Tracing the Pandemic Possibility Frontier for the U.S," CEPR Discussion Papers 15256, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
    3. Philipp Engler & Nathalie Pouokam & Diego Rodriguez Guzman & Mrs. Irina Yakadina, 2020. "The Great Lockdown: International Risk Sharing Through Trade and Policy Coordination," IMF Working Papers 2020/242, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Judit Temesvary & Andrew Wei, 2021. "Domestic Lending and the Pandemic: How Does Banks' Exposure to Covid-19 Abroad Affect Their Lending in the United States?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2021-056r1, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 17 Nov 2021.
    2. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Reciprocated unilateralism in trade policy," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 3, pages 37-63, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Masahiko Hattori & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2019. "General analysis of dynamic oligopoly with sticky price," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2990-2998.
    4. Joseph Francois & Bernard Hoekman, 2010. "Services Trade and Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 642-692, September.
    5. Horn, Henrik, 2011. "The burden of proof in trade disputes and the environment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 15-29, July.
    6. Giovanni Maggi & Ralph Ossa, 2020. "Are Trade Agreements Good For You?," NBER Working Papers 27252, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Paul Gomme, 2020. "Labor Market and Fiscal Policy During and After the Coronavirus," Cahiers de recherche 12-2020, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    8. Luca Lambertini & Arsen Palestini & Alessandro Tampieri, 2016. "CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externality," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(1), pages 236-252, July.
    9. Yuki SHIGETA, 2022. "A Continuous-Time Utility Maximization Problem with Borrowing Constraints in Macroeconomic Heterogeneous Agent Models:A Case of Regular Controls under Markov Chain Uncertainty," Discussion papers e-22-009, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    10. Açıkgöz, Ömer T. & Benchekroun, Hassan, 2017. "Anticipated international environmental agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 306-336.
    11. Xiaochi Wu, 2022. "Existence of value for a differential game with asymmetric information and signal revealing," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 213-247, March.
    12. Graham, James & Ozbilgin, Murat, 2021. "Age, industry, and unemployment risk during a pandemic lockdown," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    13. Ana Mauleon & Huasheng Song & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2010. "Networks of Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 471-500, June.
    14. Régis Chenavaz & Corina Paraschiv & Gabriel Turinici, 2017. "Dynamic Pricing of New Products in Competitive Markets: A Mean-Field Game Approach," Working Papers hal-01592958, HAL.
    15. Reinhard Neck & Dmitri Blueschke, 2014. "“Haircuts” for the EMU periphery: virtue or vice?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 153-175, May.
    16. Kempf, Hubert & Rossignol, Stéphane, 2013. "National politics and international agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 93-105.
    17. Saggi, Kamal & Wong, Woan Foong & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2017. "Preferential Trade Agreements and Rules of the Multilateral Trading System," MPRA Paper 76330, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Guillaume Bataille & Benteng Zou, 2024. "International Fisheries Agreements: Endogenous Exits, Shapley Values, and Moratorium Fishing Policy," DEM Discussion Paper Series 24-06, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    19. Benchekroun, Hassan & Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita & Tasneem, Dina, 2020. "On the impact of trade in a common property renewable resource oligopoly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    20. Houštecká, Anna & Koh, Dongya & Santaeulàlia-Llopis, Raül, 2021. "Contagion at work: Occupations, industries and human contact," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pandemic; COVID-19;

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19149. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.