Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games
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- Barthelemy, Jean & Mengus, Eric, 2024. "Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
- Jean Barthélemy & Eric Mengus, 2022. "Time-Consistent Implementation in Macroeconomic Games," Working papers 902, Banque de France.
References listed on IDEAS
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- Roc Armenter, 2008. "A General Theory (and Some Evidence) of Expectation Traps in Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(5), pages 867-895, August.
- Roc Armenter, 2008. "A General Theory (and Some Evidence) of Expectation Traps in Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(5), pages 867-895, August.
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Cited by:
- Gaballo, Gaetano & Mengus, Eric, 2023.
"Myopic fiscal objectives and long-Run monetary efficiency,"
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- Gaballo, Gaetano & Mengus, Eric, 2022. "Myopic Fiscal Objectives and Long-Run Monetary Efficiency," CEPR Discussion Papers 17360, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
Implementation; Limited commitment; Policy rules;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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