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Tighter Credit and Consumer Bankruptcy Insurance

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  • Cavalcanti, Tiago
  • Antunes, António
  • Mendicino, Caterina
  • Peruffo, Marcel
  • Villamil, Anne

Abstract

How does bankruptcy protection affect household balance sheet adjustments and aggregate consumption when credit tightens? Using a tractable model of unsecured consumer credit we quantify the trade-off between the insurance and the creditworthiness effects of bankruptcy in response to tighter credit. We show that bankruptcy dampens the effect of tighter credit on aggregate consumption on impact. This is because it allows borrowers to sustain consumption against severe financial distress. However, by leading to consumers’ exclusion from the credit market for a certain period, bankruptcy also reduces their ability to smooth consumption over time, implying a slower recovery. The bankruptcy code establishes how costly it is to default, and, thus, plays a crucial role in determining consumers’ bankruptcy decisions and in shaping consumption dynamics. We quantify that the 2005 BAPCPA reform, by making filing for bankruptcy more costly, worsened the negative welfare effects of the subsequent credit tightening.

Suggested Citation

  • Cavalcanti, Tiago & Antunes, António & Mendicino, Caterina & Peruffo, Marcel & Villamil, Anne, 2020. "Tighter Credit and Consumer Bankruptcy Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 14330, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14330
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    1. Lara Wemans & Manuel Coutinho Pereira, 2022. "Characteristics of parties and duration of insolvency cases in Portugal," Economic Bulletin and Financial Stability Report Articles and Banco de Portugal Economic Studies, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deleveraging; Chapter 7; Bapcpa;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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