Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Endogenous Proposal Rights
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Cited by:
- Emin Karagözoğlu & Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2021. "Costly Preparations in Bargaining," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(2), pages 532-557, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
Mechanism design; Optimal pricing; Bargaining power;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2019-03-04 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-DES-2019-03-04 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2019-03-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2019-03-04 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-WAR-2019-03-04 (War and peace)
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