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Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting. An Experiment on Four California Propositions

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  • Casella, Alessandra
  • Sanchez, Luis

Abstract

Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting are voting systems designed to account for voters' intensity of preferences. We test their performance in two samples of California residents using data on four initiatives prepared for the 2016 California ballot. We bootstrap the original samples and generate two sets of 10,000 multi-elections simulations. As per design, both systems induce minority victories and result in higher expected welfare relative to majority voting. In our parametrization, quadratic voting induces more minority victories and achieves higher average welfare, but causes more frequent inefficient minority victories. The results are robust to different plausible rules-of-thumb in casting votes.

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  • Casella, Alessandra & Sanchez, Luis, 2019. "Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting. An Experiment on Four California Propositions," CEPR Discussion Papers 13479, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13479
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    1. Casella Alessandra & Ehrenberg Shuky & Gelman Andrew & Shen Jie, 2010. "Protecting Minorities in Large Binary Elections: A Test of Storable Votes Using Field Data," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-35, October.
    2. JAMES G. MacKINNON, 2006. "Bootstrap Methods in Econometrics," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 82(s1), pages 2-18, September.
    3. Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew, 2008. "A simple scheme to improve the efficiency of referenda," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2240-2261, October.
    4. Christoph Bartneck & Andreas Duenser & Elena Moltchanova & Karolina Zawieska, 2015. "Comparing the Similarity of Responses Received from Studies in Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to Studies Conducted Online and with Direct Recruitment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(4), pages 1-23, April.
    5. David Quarfoot & Douglas Kohorn & Kevin Slavin & Rory Sutherland & David Goldstein & Ellen Konar, 2017. "Quadratic voting in the wild: real people, real votes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 283-303, July.
    6. Casella, Alessandra, 2012. "Storable Votes: Protecting the Minority Voice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195309089.
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    Cited by:

    1. David K. Levine, 2020. "Radical Markets by Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl: A Review Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(2), pages 471-487, June.
    2. Kirsten Cornelson & Boriana Miloucheva, 2022. "Political polarization and cooperation during a pandemic," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(9), pages 2025-2049, September.
    3. Casella, Alessandra & Macé, Antonin, 2020. "Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democracy; Voting; Majority;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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