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A note on equilibrium leadership in tax competition models

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  • HINDRIKS, Jean
  • NISHIMURA, Yukihiro

Abstract

This paper reexamines the work of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J. Pub. Econ. 94: 768-776, 2010), which shows that leadership by the small region is the risk dominant equilibrium under the endogenous timing game. They obtain this result in a model where the asymmetry among countries translates into different gradients of the demand for capital but identical vertical intercept. In this note, we simply reverse the form of asymmetry by considering different vertical intercepts but identical gradient. The reason is that market power is typically related to the intercept and not to the slope of the demand function. We then show that the large region tax leadership becomes the risk dominant equilibrium and can even become Pareto superior.
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Suggested Citation

  • HINDRIKS, Jean & NISHIMURA, Yukihiro, 2015. "A note on equilibrium leadership in tax competition models," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2640, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2640
    Note: In : Journal of Public Economics, 121, 66-68, 2015
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amir, Rabah & Stepanova, Anna, 2006. "Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-20, April.
    2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, April.
    3. Hindriks, Jean & Myles, Gareth D., 2013. "Intermediate Public Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262018691, April.
    4. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
    5. Hubert Kempf & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2014. "And the Tax Winner Is… Endogenous Timing in the Commodity Taxation Race," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01306077, HAL.
    6. Hubert Kempf & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in the tax competition race," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00492105, HAL.
    7. Hvidt Morten & Bo Nielsen Søren, 2001. "Non-cooperative vs. Minimum- Rate Commodity Taxation," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 2(4), pages 315-326, December.
    8. Kempf, Hubert & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 768-776, October.
    9. Fujita,Masahisa & Thisse,Jacques-François, 2013. "Economics of Agglomeration," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521171960, October.
    10. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-892, September.
    11. Nigar Hashimzade & Jean Hindriks & Gareth D. Myles, 2006. "Solutions Manual to Accompany Intermediate Public Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582694, April.
    12. Baldwin, Richard E. & Krugman, Paul, 2004. "Agglomeration, integration and tax harmonisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-23, February.
    13. You-Qiang Wang, 1999. "Commodity Taxes under Fiscal Competition: Stackelberg Equilibrium and Optimality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 974-981, September.
    14. Hikaru Ogawa, 2013. "Further analysis on leadership in tax competition: the role of capital ownership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(3), pages 474-484, June.
    15. Kempf, H. & Rota Graziosi, G., 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in tax competition: a timing game perspective," Working papers 299, Banque de France.
    16. repec:adr:anecst:y:2014:i:113-114:p:4 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. HINDRIKS, Jean & nishimura, YUKIHIRO, 2014. "International tax leadership among asymmetric countries," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2020. "Kant–Nash tax competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(5), pages 1108-1147, October.
    2. Jean Hindriks & Yukihiro Nishimura, 2017. "Equilibrium leadership in tax competition models with capital ownership: a rejoinder," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(2), pages 338-349, April.
    3. Hikaru Ogawa & Atsushi Yamagishi, 2016. "Ad Valorem Capital Tax Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1030, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    4. Chen, Jing & Chen, Bintong & Li, Wei, 2018. "Who should be pricing leader in the presence of customer returns?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 265(2), pages 735-747.
    5. Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota‐Graziosi, 2020. "Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 359-402, February.
    6. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Daiki Kishishita, 2021. "Tax competition and political agency problems," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(4), pages 1782-1810, November.
    7. Agrawal, David R. & Trandel, Gregory A., 2019. "Dynamics of policy adoption with state dependence," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    8. Hikaru Ogawa & Taiki Susa, 2017. "Majority voting and endogenous timing in tax competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(3), pages 397-415, June.
    9. Keisuke Kawachi & Hikaru Ogawa & Taiki Susa, 2019. "Endogenizing government’s objectives in tax competition with capital ownership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(3), pages 571-594, June.
    10. Carsten Eckel & Yutao Han & Kate Hynes & Jin Zhang, 2021. "Structural fund, endogenous move and commitment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(2), pages 465-482, April.
    11. Jean Hindriks & Yukihiro Nishimura, 2021. "Taxing multinationals: The scope for enforcement cooperation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(3), pages 487-509, June.
    12. Kawachi, Keisuke & Ogawa, Hikaru & Susa, Taiki, 2020. "Endogenous capital supply and equilibrium leadership in tax competition," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 622-634.
    13. Torben K. Mideksa, 2021. "Leadership and Climate Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 9054, CESifo.
    14. Hindriks, Jean & Nishimura, Yukihiro, 2014. "On the timing of tax and investment in fiscal competition models," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014065, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Jun‐ichi Itaya & Chikara Yamaguchi, 2023. "Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(2), pages 276-300, April.
    16. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2018. "Competition in emissions standards and capital taxes with local pollution," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 191-203.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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