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Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model

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  • GERMAIN, Marc
  • TULKENS, Henry

    (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

  • MAGNUS, Alphonse

Abstract

This article deals with cooperation issues in international pollution problems in a two dimensional dynamic framework implied by the accumulation of the pollutant and of the capital goods. Assuming that countries do reevaluate at each period the advantages to cooperate or not given the current stocks of pollutant and capital, and under the assumption that damage cost functions are linear, we define at each period of time a transfer scheme between countries, which makes cooperation better for each of them than non-cooperation. This transfer scheme is also strategically stable in the sense that it discourages partial coalitions.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • GERMAIN, Marc & TULKENS, Henry & MAGNUS, Alphonse, 2009. "Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2009021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2009021
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    1. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 153-175, Springer.
    2. Marc Germain & Philippe Toint & Henry Tulkens & Aart Zeeuw, 2006. "Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 251-274, Springer.
    3. Johan Eyckmans & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 218-249, Springer.
    4. Henry Tulkens, 2006. "An Economic Model of International Negotiations Relating to Transfrontier Pollution," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 107-121, Springer.
    5. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
    6. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Theoretical Foundations of Negotiations and Cost Sharing in Transfrontier Pollution Problems," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 123-134, Springer.
    7. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 176-193, Springer.
    8. Marc Germain & Henry Tulkens & Aart de Zeeuw, 1998. "Stabilité stratégique en matière de pollution internationale avec effet de stock. Le cas linéaire," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(6), pages 1435-1454.
    9. S. Jørgensen & G. Martín-Herrán & G. Zaccour, 2003. "Agreeability and Time Consistency in Linear-State Differential Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 119(1), pages 49-63, October.
    10. Veijo Kaitala & Matti Pohjola & Olli Tahvonen, 1992. "Transboundary air pollution and soil acidification: A dynamic analysis of an acid rain game between Finland and the USSR," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 161-181, March.
    11. Rubio, Santiago J. & Ulph, Alistair, 2007. "An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 296-310, November.
    12. GERMAIN , Marc & TOINT , Philippe & TULKENS, Henry, 1997. "Financial transfers to ensure cooperative international optimality in stock pollutant abatement," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    13. Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson (ed.), 1986. "New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262690934, April.
    14. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
    15. GERMAIN, Marc & TOINT, Philippe & TULKENS, Henry, 1998. "Financial transfers to sustain cooperative international optimality in stock pollutant abatement," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1369, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Henry Tulkens, 2016. "COP 21 and Economic Theory: Taking Stock," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 126(4), pages 471-486.
    2. Arsen Palestini & Ilaria Poggio, 2015. "A Bayesian potential game to illustrate heterogeneity in cost/benefit characteristics," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 62(1), pages 23-39, March.
    3. Ansink, Erik & Houba, Harold, 2016. "Sustainable agreements on stochastic river flow," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 92-117.
    4. Erik Ansink, 2009. "Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation," Working Papers 2009.73, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Brian Chi-ang Lin & Siqi Zheng & Marco Rogna, 2016. "Cooperative Game Theory Applied To Ieas: A Comparison Of Solution Concepts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 649-678, July.
    6. Tulkens, Henry, 2016. "COP 21 and Economic Theory: Taking Stock," ET: Economic Theory 236237, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    7. Tulkens, Henry, 2014. "Internal vs. core coalitional stability in the environmental externality game: A reconciliation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014058, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    stock pollutant; capital accumulation; international environmental agreements; dynamic core solution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • O21 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Planning Models; Planning Policy

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