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COP 21 and Economic Theory: Taking Stock

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  • Henry Tulkens

Abstract

The texts of the COP 21 Decision and its Annex are scrutinized from the particular point of view of the extent to which economic theoretic concepts can be considered to inspire them. While this is shown to be partially the case in some of the intentions, the texts themselves contain more diplomatically formulated promises than implementation of mainstream well established economic concepts.

Suggested Citation

  • Henry Tulkens, 2016. "COP 21 and Economic Theory: Taking Stock," CESifo Working Paper Series 5918, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5918
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    Cited by:

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    2. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2019. "Bottom‐up world climate policies: Preserving fossil fuel deposits vs. capping fuel consumption," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 993-1035, August.
    3. Torben K. Mideksa, 2021. "Leadership and Climate Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 9054, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic and game theory concepts; international climate agreements; voluntary cooperation; greenhouse gas emissions; transfers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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