Two examples of strategic equilibria in approval voting games
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Cited by:
- Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December.
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More about this item
Keywords
Approval voting; sophisticated voting; perfect equilibrium; stable set;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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