Economic Growth and the Household Optimal Income Tax Evasion
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References listed on IDEAS
- Cowell, Frank A. & P.F. Gordon, James, 1988. "Unwillingness to pay : Tax evasion and public good provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 305-321, August.
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- Been-Lon Chen, 2003. "Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 381-403, April.
- Falkinger, Josef, 1991. "On optimal public good provision with tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 127-133, June.
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