IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/009136.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Seguridad democrática, presencia de la policía y conflicto en Colombia

Author

Listed:
  • Darwin Cortés
  • María del Rosario Franco
  • Laura Hincapié
  • Juan Vargas

Abstract

Resumen: Este artículo evalúa uno de los componentes fundamentales de la política más icónica del gobierno de Álvaro Uribe: la Seguridad Democrática. En particular, se evalúa el impacto sobre la intensidad del conflicto armado de los despliegues y refuerzos de policía en municipios con poca o nula presencia policial antes de agosto de 2002. Para ello se utiliza el estimador de diferencia en diferencias que compara el cambio en la dinámica del conflicto una vez se asignan los nuevos efectivos a los municipios receptores, relativo al cambio ocurrido simultáneamente en los municipios no receptores. Nuestros resultados sugieren que tanto los despliegues (instauración de inspecciones de policía en municipios que carecían de éstas) como los refuerzos (envío de nuevos efectivos a municipios con poca presencia policial previa) generan incrementos en el número de ataques guerrilleros. Por otro lado, también hay evidencia que en los casos en los que la asignación de efectivos policiales estuvo acompanada de la movilización de tropas del ejército el conflicto disminuyó en las areas afectadas, lo que sugiere que la coordinación de las fuerzas armadas resulta clave para el éxito de iniciativas regionales de seguridad.AbstractThis article assesses one of the fundamental components of the most iconic policy of the government of Álvaro Uribe: the Democratic Security. In particular we assess the impact on the intensity of the armed conflict, of police deployment and reinforces in municipalities with little of no police presence before August 2002. We use the di erence in di erences estimator to compare the change in a dynamics of the armed conflict after the allocation of new police forces in the receiving municipalities, relative to the simultaneous change in municipalities that did not receive police. Results suggest that both deployments and reinforces increase the number of guerrilla attacks. On the other hand there is evidence that in the cases in which the allocation of police forces was accompanied by the mobilization of army troops the intensity of the conflict decreased in the affected areas. This suggests that the coordination between armed state forces is key for the success of local security initiatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Darwin Cortés & María del Rosario Franco & Laura Hincapié & Juan Vargas, 2011. "Seguridad democrática, presencia de la policía y conflicto en Colombia," Documentos de Trabajo 9136, Universidad del Rosario.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000092:009136
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/10884/9136.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Theorizing about conflict," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 165-189, Elsevier.
    3. Jorge Restrepo & Michael Spagat & Juan Vargas, 2004. "The Dynamics of the Columbian Civil Conflict: A New Dataset," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 21, pages 396-429.
    4. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Defense Economics," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 1.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gerson Javier Perez, 2012. "Primera versión de la política de seguridad democrática: se cumplieron los objetivos?," Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, December.
    2. Gerson Javier Pérez Valbuena, 2014. "La política de seguridad democrática 2002-2006: efectos socioeconómicos en las áreas rurales," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 16(30), pages 241-270, January-J.
    3. Morales, Juan S., 2021. "Legislating during war: Conflict and politics in Colombia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    4. Juan Carlos Mu�oz-Mora & Santiago Tob�n-Zapata & Jesse d'Anjou, 2014. "Does land titling matter? The role of land property rights in the war on illicit crops in Colombia," HiCN Working Papers 168, Households in Conflict Network.
    5. Muñoz-Mora, Juan Carlos & Tobón, Santiago & d’Anjou, Jesse Willem, 2018. "The role of land property rights in the war on illicit crops: Evidence from Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 268-283.
    6. Martínez, Luis R., 2017. "Transnational insurgents: Evidence from Colombia's FARC at the border with Chávez's Venezuela," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 138-153.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    2. Alexander Cotte Poveda, 2012. "Estimating Effectiveness of the Control of Violence and Socioeconomic Development in Colombia: An Application of Dynamic Data Envelopment Analysis and Data Panel Approach," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 105(3), pages 343-366, February.
    3. Mounu Prem & Juan F. Vargas & Olga Namen, 2023. "The Human Capital Peace Dividend," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 58(3), pages 962-1002.
    4. Sanjeev Goyal & Adrien Vigier, 2014. "Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1518-1542.
    5. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "The Economics of Destructive Power," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Serhan Cevik & Mohammad Rahmati, 2015. "Breaking the Curse of Sisyphus: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Conflict Economic Transitions," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 57(4), pages 569-597, December.
    7. Anderton Charles H., 2014. "Killing Civilians as an Inferior Input in a Rational Choice Model of Genocide and Mass Killing," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 327-346, April.
    8. Raul Caruso, 2009. "Spesa pubblica e criminalità organizzata in Italia: evidenza empirica su dati Panel nel periodo 1997-2003," Economia & lavoro, Carocci editore, issue 1, pages 1-73.
    9. Boudreau, James W. & Shunda, Nicholas, 2012. "On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 498-501.
    10. Hwang, Sung-Ha, 2012. "Technology of military conflict, military spending, and war," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 226-236.
    11. Ken Yahagi, 2018. "Welfare effects of forming a criminal organization," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 359-375, December.
    12. Lemus Natalia, 2014. "Conflict-Induced Poverty: Evidence from Colombia," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 113-142, January.
    13. Martínez, Luis R., 2017. "Transnational insurgents: Evidence from Colombia's FARC at the border with Chávez's Venezuela," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 138-153.
    14. Alexander Cotte Poveda, 2011. "Estimating Effectiveness of the Control of Violence and Socioeconomic Development in Colombia: An Application of DEA and Data Panel Approach," Serie de Documentos en Economía y Violencia 8356, Centro de Investigaciones en Violencia, Instituciones y Desarrollo Económico (VIDE).
    15. Jefferson DP Bertolai & Luiz GDS Scorzafave, 2021. "Property rights’ emergence in illicit drug markets," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(1), pages 52-105, February.
    16. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.
    17. Alexander Cotte Poveda, 2011. "Estimando la efectividad en el control de la violencia y el desarrollo socio-económico en Colombia," Serie de Documentos en Economía y Violencia 8079, Centro de Investigaciones en Violencia, Instituciones y Desarrollo Económico (VIDE).
    18. Edgar H. Sanchez-Cuevas, 2018. "Fighting Fire with Aid: Development Assistance as Counterinsurency Tool. Evidence for Colombia," Documentos CEDE 16378, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    19. van Ours, Jan C. & Williams, Jenny & Ward, Shannon, 2015. "Bad Behavior: Delinquency, Arrest and Early School Leaving," CEPR Discussion Papers 10755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Khalil, Umair, 2017. "Do more guns lead to more crime? Understanding the role of illegal firearms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 342-361.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Seguridad democrática; despliegues y refuerzos de policía; conflicto; Colombia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000092:009136. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Facultad de Economía (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ferosco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.