Why do Biased Heuristics Approximate Bayes Rule in Double Auctions?
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Other versions of this item:
- Jamal, Karim & Sunder, Shyam, 2001. "Why do biased heuristics approximate Bayes rule in double auctions?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 431-435, December.
- Shyam NMI Sunder & Karim Jamal, 2001. "Why do Biased Heuristics Approximate Bayes Rule in Double Auctions?," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm197, Yale School of Management.
References listed on IDEAS
- Jamal, Karim & Sunder, Shyam, 1996. "Bayesian equilibrium in double auctions populated by biased heuristic traders," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 273-291, November.
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Cited by:
- Shyam Sunder & MODELS A, 2002.
"Markets as Artifacts: Aggregate Efficiency from Zero-Intelligence Traders,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers
ysm284, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Sep 2004.
- Shyam Sunder & MODELS A, 2002. "Markets as Artifacts: Aggregate Efficiency from Zero-Intelligence Traders," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm284, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Sep 2004.
- Lu, Dong & Zhan, Yaosong, 2022. "Over-the-counter versus double auction in asset markets with near-zero-intelligence traders," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
- Karim Jamal & Michael Maier & Shyam Sunder, 2019. "Aggregation of Diverse Information with Double Auction Trading among Minimally-Intelligent Algorithmic Agents," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2182, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
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