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Political Foundations Of The Thrift Debacle

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  • ROMER, T.
  • WEINGAST, B.R.

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  • Romer, T. & Weingast, B.R., 1990. "Political Foundations Of The Thrift Debacle," GSIA Working Papers 1990-14, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:1990-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. Dan Brumbaugh & Robert E. Litan, 1990. "The Banks Are Worse off than You Think," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 4-12, January.
    2. R. Dan Brumbaugh, JR. & Andrew S. Carron & Robert E. Litan, 1989. "Cleaning Up the Depository Institutions Mess," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1), pages 243-296.
    3. Kane, Edward J, 1989. "The High Cost of Incompletely Funding the FSLIC Shortage of Explicit Capital," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 31-47, Fall.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kroszner, Randall S., 2000. "Obstacles To Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," Working Papers 158, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    2. Calomiris, Charles W. & Flandreau, Marc & Laeven, Luc, 2016. "Political foundations of the lender of last resort: A global historical narrative," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 48-65.
    3. Philip Keefer, 2002. "Politics and the Determinants of Banking Crises: The Effects of Political Checks and Balances," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.),Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 3, pages 085-112, Central Bank of Chile.
    4. Colburn, Christopher B. & Hudgins, Sylvia C., 1996. "The influence on Congress by the thrift industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 473-494, April.
    5. Keefer, Philip, 2004. "Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3439, The World Bank.
    6. Mian, Atif & Sufi, Amir & Trebbi, Francesco, 2013. "The Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(4), pages 373-408, October.
    7. Haselmann, Rainer & Kick, Thomas & Behn, Markus & Vig, Vikrant, 2015. "The Political Economy of Bank Bailouts," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113082, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Brock, Philip L, 2000. "Financial Safety Nets: Lessons from Chile," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 15(1), pages 69-84, February.
    9. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 233-272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 408-432.
    11. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1967-1998, December.
    12. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    13. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 1-28, April.
    14. Keefer, Philip, 2001. "When do special interests run rampant ? disentangling the role in banking crises of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2543, The World Bank.
    15. Alexis Antoniades & Charles W. Calomiris, 2018. "Mortgage Market Credit Conditions and U.S. Presidential Elections," NBER Working Papers 24459, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Brock, Philip L., 1998. "Financial safety nets and incentive structures in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1993, The World Bank.
    17. Kupiec, Paul H. & Ramirez, Carlos D., 2013. "Bank failures and the cost of systemic risk: Evidence from 1900 to 1930," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 285-307.
    18. Randall S. Kroszner, 2000. "The economics and politics of financial modernization," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 25-37.
    19. Antoniades, Alexis & Calomiris, Charles W., 2020. "Mortgage market credit conditions and U.S. Presidential elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).

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    Keywords

    interest rate ; savings ; risk;
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