IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levarc/440.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Evolutionary Dynamics for Bimatrix Games: A Hamiltonian system?

Author

Listed:
  • J. Hofbauer

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Hofbauer, 2010. "Evolutionary Dynamics for Bimatrix Games: A Hamiltonian system?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 440, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:440
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4440.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Samuelson, L., 1989. "Evolutionnary Stability In Asymmetric Games," Papers 11-8-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    2. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cressman, R., 1997. "Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Excess payoff dynamics, potential dynamics, and stable games," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    2. Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April.
    3. Cabrales, Antonio, 1999. "Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 159-184, June.
    4. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
    5. Hopkins, Ed, 1999. "Learning, Matching, and Aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 79-110, January.
    6. Viossat, Yannick, 2008. "Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 27-43, July.
    7. Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 1997. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, November.
    8. Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1996. "Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 558-573, November.
    9. Heifetz, Aviad & Shannon, Chris & Spiegel, Yossi, 2007. "What to maximize if you must," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 31-57, March.
    10. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
    11. Segismundo S. Izquierdo & Luis R. Izquierdo, 2011. "Strictly Dominated Strategies in the Replicator-Mutator Dynamics," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(3), pages 1-10, September.
    12. Ross Cressman, 2009. "Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 221-247, June.
    13. Huw Dixon & Ernesto Somma, "undated". "Coordination and Equilibrium selection in mean defined supermodular games under payoff monotonic selection dynamics," Discussion Papers 99/37, Department of Economics, University of York.
    14. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2007. "The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 251-286, August.
    15. Yannick Viossat, 2005. "Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium: Elimination of All Strategies in the Support of Correlated Equilibria," Working Papers hal-00242977, HAL.
    16. Yasuhiro Shirata, 2012. "The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 1-21, February.
    17. Berger, Ulrich & Hofbauer, Josef, 2006. "Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-6, July.
    18. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 011, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    19. Jorg Oechssler & Karl Schlag, 1997. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example," Game Theory and Information 9704001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Apr 1997.
    20. Demichelis, Stefano & Germano, Fabrizio, 2002. "On (un)knots and dynamics in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 46-60, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:440. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David K. Levine (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.