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Régulation et mode de gestion : une étude économétrique sur les prix et la performance dans le secteur de l'eau potable

Author

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  • Marcel Boyer
  • Serge Garcia

Abstract

We model the interactions between management regimes (municipal vs. delegated) and operating costs of water supply services in order to compare their performance and pricing. We estimate the models from panel data in France. We show that the choice between management regimes at the local community level depends on costs and service characteristics, that there is a significant difference in average productive efficiency in favor of delegated services, and that municipal services appear more efficient in network returns. Under delegation, the margins realized by operators depend on service and contract characteristics. Nous modélisons les interactions entre mode de gestion (régie ou délégation) et coûts d'exploitation des services d'eau potable afin de comparer leurs performances et la tarification. Nous estimons ces modèles sur des données de panel en France. Nous montrons que le choix de la collectivité locale dépend des coûts et des caractéristiques des services. Il existe une différence significative d'efficacité productive moyenne en faveur de la gestion déléguée, mais les services en régie semblent plus performants sur les rendements de réseau. Les marges réalisées par l'exploitant sont expliquées par les caractéristiques des services, et celles du contrat dans le cas de délégation.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer & Serge Garcia, 2008. "Régulation et mode de gestion : une étude économétrique sur les prix et la performance dans le secteur de l'eau potable," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-25, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2008s-25
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2008s-25.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lætitia Guérin-Schneider & Michel Nakhla, 2012. "Emergence of an innovative regulation mode in water utilities in France: between commission regulation and franchise bidding," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 23-45, February.
    2. Hélène Bouscasse & François Destandau & Serge S. Garcia, 2006. "Analyse économétrique des coûts des services d'eau potable et qualité des prestations offertes aux usagers," Post-Print hal-01072367, HAL.
    3. François Destandau & Serge Garcia, 2014. "Service quality, scale economies and ownership: an econometric analysis of water supply costs," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 152-182, October.
    4. Abildtrup, Jens & Garcia, Serge & Stenger, Anne, 2013. "The effect of forest land use on the cost of drinking water supply: A spatial econometric analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 126-136.
    5. Noubissi Domguia, 2017. "Taking into account of the quality of the services un the public drinking water services [Prise En Compte De La Qualite Des Prestations Dans Les Services Publics D'Eau Services]," Working Papers hal-01504396, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    water supply services; management regime; selection model; cost function; pricing; panel data; services d'eau potable; mode de gestion; modèle de sélection; fonction de coût; tarification; données de panel.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities

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