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The Choice of Instruments for Environmental Policy: Liability or Regulation?

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  • Marcel Boyer
  • Donatella Porrini

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2002. "The Choice of Instruments for Environmental Policy: Liability or Regulation?," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-17, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2002s-17
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2002s-17.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rohan Pitchford, 2001. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 739-745, June.
    2. Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 2001. "The Public-Private Sector Risk-Sharing in the French Insurance "Cat. Nat. System"""," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-60, CIRANO.
    3. Steven Shavell, 1983. "Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety," NBER Working Papers 1218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Shavell, S., 1986. "The judgment proof problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-58, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Bentata, 2014. "Liability as a complement to environmental regulation: an empirical study of the French legal system," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 16(3), pages 201-228, July.
    2. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2008. "The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor For Environmental Disasters: Lessons For Optimal Insurance Regulation," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-03, CIRANO.
    3. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2007. "Sharing Liability Between Banks and Firms: The Case of Industrial Safety Risk," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-04, CIRANO.
    4. Wasylyniuk, Chad R. & Bessel, Kristan M. & Kerr, William A. & Hobbs, Jill E., 2003. "The Evolving International Trade Regime For Food Safety And Environmental Standards: Potential Opportunities And Constraints For Saskatchewan'S Beef Feedlot Industry," Reports 23937, Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade.
    5. Donatella Porrini & Reimund Schwarze, 2014. "Insurance models and European climate change policies: an assessment," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 7-28, August.
    6. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2004. "Modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(3), pages 590-612, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental policy; extended liability; regulatory capture; instrument choice; Politique environnementale; responsabilité élargie; capture des régulateurs; choix d'instruments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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