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L'importance des exclus de l'intégration monétaire en Europe

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  • Philippe Martin

Abstract

Contrairement à l'analyse traditionnelle, nous analysons les coûts associés non pas à l'inclusion mais à l'exclusion d'un pays de l'Union économique et monétaire européenne (UEM). Dans un modèle à trois pays, nous montrons que la politique monétaire du pays exclu sera plus expansionniste et plus contre-cyclique que celle des pays de l'UEM, ce qui la rapproche d'une stratégie de dépréciation compétitive. Le pays dont les chocs sont les plus symétriques à ceux du pays exclu sera le plus touché par cette exclusion voyant la variance de sa production augmenter. Nous examinons aussi les diverses propositions de gestion des relations entre l'UEM et les pays non UEM de VUE.
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Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Martin, 1995. "L'importance des exclus de l'intégration monétaire en Europe," Working Papers 1995-08, CEPII research center.
    • Handle: RePEc:cii:cepidt:1995-08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ottilia Rouguet & Pierre Villa, 2000. "Le passage des retraites de la répartition à la capitalisation obligatoire : des simulations à l'aide s'une maquette calibrée," Working Papers 2000-02, CEPII research center.
    2. Kiichiro Fukasaku & David Martineau, 1999. "Coopération monétaire en Asie de l'Est : l'apport des tests de causalité et de la cointégration," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 140(4), pages 105-116.
    3. Thierry Warin, 2005. "Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0508, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    4. Thierry Warin, 2006. "A Note on Post-Modern Monetary Policy," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0617, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.

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    JEL classification:

    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General

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