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Self governing trusts: an agenda for evaluation

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  • Alan Shiell

Abstract

The proposals contained in the White Paper ‘Working for Patients’ have been described as an attempt to introduce competition into a non-competitive situation. Together with the introduction of practice budgets for family practitioners, the granting of self-governing status to NHS hospitals is the principle mechanism by which this aim will be achieved. Very little is known about the effects of competition on the delivery of health care. Evidence from the United Kingdom is non-existent and from the United States of America is inadequate and contradictory. Yet, despite the inconclusive nature of this evidence, the Government is implementing the most radical reforms of the NHS since its inception without any systematic attempt to monitor the extent to which the reforms achieve the desired ends. In this paper, a call is made to evaluate the effectiveness of self-governing trusts and the impact of the introduction of self-governing status on health services more generally. A variety of methods are described which would enable the reforms to be evaluated without holding back their implementation. No radical reform of the NHS can be expected to have an unambiguously beneficial impact on the delivery of health care. If the Government is genuine in its desire to improve health services in the UK, it should therefore be prepared to subject its proposals to the sort of independent evaluation described in this paper.

Suggested Citation

  • Alan Shiell, 1991. "Self governing trusts: an agenda for evaluation," Working Papers 078chedp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
  • Handle: RePEc:chy:respap:78chedp
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    File URL: http://www.york.ac.uk/media/che/documents/papers/discussionpapers/CHE%20Discussion%20Paper%2078.pdf
    File Function: First version, 1991
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Robinson, James C. & Luft, Harold S., 1985. "The impact of hospital market structure on patient volume, average length of stay, and the cost of care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 333-356, December.
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    Keywords

    competition; White Paper;

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