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Liquidity when it matters: QE and Tobin’s q

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  • Driffill, John

    (Birkbeck, University of London)

  • Miller, Marcus

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

When financial markets freeze in fear, borrowing costs for solvent governments may fall towards zero in a flight to quality – but credit-worthy private borrowers can be starved of external funding. In Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), where liquidity crisis is captured by the effective rationing of private credit, tightening credit constraints have direct effects on investment. If prices are sticky, the effects on aggregate demand can be pronounced – as reported by FRBNY for the US economy using a calibrated DSGE-style framework modified to include such frictions. In such an environment, two factors stand out. First the recycling of credit flows by central banks can dramatically ease credit-rationing faced by private investors: this is the rationale for Quantitative Easing. Second, revenue-neutral fiscal transfers aimed at would-be investors can have similar effects. We show these features in a stripped down macro model of inter-temporal optimisation subject to credit constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Driffill, John & Miller, Marcus, 2011. "Liquidity when it matters: QE and Tobin’s q," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 68, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:68
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marcus Miller & Lei Zhang, 2015. "The Hedgehog and the Fox: From DSGE to Macro-Pru," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83, pages 31-55, September.
    2. Bastanzad , Hossein, 2014. "A New Policy Environment to Achieve Monetary Goals," Journal of Money and Economy, Monetary and Banking Research Institute, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, vol. 9(4), pages 73-108, July.
    3. Engin Kara & Jasmin Sin, 2018. "The Fiscal Multiplier in a Liquidity‐Constrained New Keynesian Economy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 120(1), pages 93-123, January.
    4. John Driffill, 2016. "Unconventional Monetary Policy in the Euro Zone," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 387-404, April.
    5. Vivek Prasad, 2015. "Balanced Budget Tax Cuts in a Liquidity-Constrained Economy," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83, pages 87-119, September.
    6. Serag Masoud & Murad A. Bein & Wagdi Khalifa, 2022. "Examining the relationship between unconventional monetary policy and exchange rate movements: Empirical evidence from United States quantitative easing," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(3), pages 3444-3458, July.

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