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A Market Based Evaluation of the Election versus Appointment of Regulatory Commissioners

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  • Fields, Joseph A
  • Klein, Linda S
  • Sfiridis, James M

Abstract

This paper examines the elected versus appointed commissioner dichotomy from a market value perspective. Previous empirical analysis tends to concentrate on rates rather than examining the impact on shareholders' wealth. The authors examine life insurance industry data during the period surrounding the passage of California's Proposition 103. The primary impact of the referendum on life insurers is to change the method of commissioner selection from appointment to popular vote. They find that this change significantly reduced the value of life insurers doing business in California. This result is consistent with the recent findings of Boyes and McDowell (1989) and Smartt (1994) using alternative evaluation procedures for firms in other regulated industries. This implies that the change to a popular election of commissioners either increases the level of risk and/or decreases the expected cash flows of regulated firms. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Fields, Joseph A & Klein, Linda S & Sfiridis, James M, 1997. "A Market Based Evaluation of the Election versus Appointment of Regulatory Commissioners," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 337-351, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:92:y:1997:i:3-4:p:337-51
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
    2. Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2020. "Benefits to the majority from universal service," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(2), pages 391-408, April.
    3. Mark Partridge & Tim Sass, 2011. "The productivity of elected and appointed officials: the case of school superintendents," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 133-149, October.
    4. Flavio M. Menezes & Christian Roessler, 2010. "Good and Bad Consistency in Regulatory Decisions," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 86(275), pages 504-516, December.
    5. Troy Quast, 2008. "Do elected public utility commissioners behave more politically than appointed ones?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 318-337, June.
    6. Jivas Chakravarthy & Katie E. McDermott & Roger M. White, 2021. "Are Regulators Effective at Unraveling Accounting Manipulation? Evidence from Public Utility Commissions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(7), pages 4532-4555, July.
    7. Ruben Enikolopov, 2010. "Politicians, Bureaucrats and Targeted Redistribution: The Role of Career Concerns," Working Papers w0148, New Economic School (NES).
    8. Sounman Hong & Taek Kyu Kim, 2017. "Regulatory capture in agency performance evaluation: industry expertise versus revolving-door lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 167-186, April.
    9. Enikolopov, Ruben, 2014. "Politicians, bureaucrats and targeted redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 74-83.
    10. Leverty, J. Tyler & Grace, Martin F., 2018. "Do elections delay regulatory action?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 409-427.
    11. Galina Zudenkova, 2015. "Political cronyism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 473-492, March.
    12. Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, 2011. "Revolving door laws and state public utility commissioners," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(4), pages 405-424, December.

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