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Electricity Prices during the Energy Crisis in Germany: The Role of Market Power

Author

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  • Till Fladung
  • Anna Saile

Abstract

During the energy crisis in 2022, electricity prices in Germany soared to unprecedented levels. To explore the drivers of the high electricity prices, we develop an electricity dispatch model that simulates hourly equilibrium prices under the assumption of perfect competition. We then extend this model to account for firms exercising market power. By comparing the outcomes of the perfect competition and Cournot competition models with actual market data, we demonstrate that market power may contributed to higher prices during the crisis, elevating them beyond what rising input costs alone would justify.

Suggested Citation

  • Till Fladung & Anna Saile, 2024. "Electricity Prices during the Energy Crisis in Germany: The Role of Market Power," ifo Working Paper Series 414, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifowps:_414
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Energy Economics; Market Power; Energy Crisis; Electricity Prices; Cournot Competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q43 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Energy and the Macroeconomy
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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