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Democracy and International Conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Vesperoni
  • Karl Wärneryd

Abstract

During the past two centuries, western nations have successively extended the voting franchise to citizens of lower income. We explain this process of democratization as a rational way for incumbent elites to wage war effectively on other nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a lower tax cost of arming may confer a strategic delegation advantage. We find supporting empirical evidence in case studies of franchise extensions in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Vesperoni & Karl Wärneryd, 2016. "Democracy and International Conflict," CESifo Working Paper Series 5856, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5856
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    war; conflict; contest; democracy; franchise extension;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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