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Forward Guidance in a Simple Model with a Zero Lower Bound

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  • Gerhard Illing
  • Thomas Siemsen

Abstract

In this paper we present a three period setup to model central bank forward guidance in a liquidity trap. We analyze the role of long-run and short-run price stickiness under discretion and commitment in a straightforward and intuitive way. Despite the impact of price rigidity on welfare being non-linear, losses under discretion are lowest with perfectly flexible prices. We show why the zero lower bound may still be binding even long after the shock has gone and characterize conditions when a commitment to hold nominal rates at zero for an extended period is optimal. We then introduce government spending and show that under persistently low policy rates optimal government spending becomes more front-loaded, while procyclical austerity fares worse than discretionary government spending.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerhard Illing & Thomas Siemsen, 2014. "Forward Guidance in a Simple Model with a Zero Lower Bound," CESifo Working Paper Series 4702, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4702
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laurence M. Ball, 2013. "The Case for Four Percent Inflation," Central Bank Review, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, vol. 13(2), pages 17-31.
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    6. Jing Cynthia Wu & Fan Dora Xia, 2016. "Measuring the Macroeconomic Impact of Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(2-3), pages 253-291, March.
    7. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    8. John H. Cochrane, 2013. "The New-Keynesian Liquidity Trap," NBER Working Papers 19476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Garcés Díaz Daniel, 2017. "Explaining Inflation with a Classical Dichotomy Model and Switching Monetary Regimes: Mexico 1932-2013," Working Papers 2017-20, Banco de México.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    zero lower bound; forward guidance; commitment; optimal policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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