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Centralized Fiscal Spending by Supranational Unions

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  • Jenny Simon
  • Justin Mattias Valasek

Abstract

We study fiscal spending by supranational unions, where participation is voluntary and countries bargain over contributions to and the allocation of a central budget. We explore the link between the allocation and nations’ contributions that occurs since bargaining power is endogenous, and generically causes inefficiency. Interestingly, redistribution arises endogenously, despite nations being purely self-interested. However, there exists a trade-off between increasing equality and decreasing efficiency, which becomes more severe as the centralized budget increases. We also analyze partial ex-ante commitment through alternative decision-making institutions: Both majority rule and exogenous tax rules can improve efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Jenny Simon & Justin Mattias Valasek, 2013. "Centralized Fiscal Spending by Supranational Unions," CESifo Working Paper Series 4321, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4321
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp4321.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jenny Simon & Justin Mattias Valasek, 2016. "The Political Economy of Multilateral Aid Funds," CESifo Working Paper Series 5857, CESifo.
    2. Gianmarco Daniele & Amedeo Piolatto & Willem Sas, 2018. "Who Sent You? Strategic Voting, Transfers and Bailouts in a Federation," Working Papers. Serie AD 2018-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    3. Axel Dreher & Kai Gehring & Christos Kotsogiannis & Silvia Marchesi, 2018. "Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: theory and evidence," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 243-265.
    4. Jenny Simon & Justin Mattias Valasek, 2017. "Centralized Fiscal Spending by Supranational Unions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 84(333), pages 78-103, January.
    5. Simon, Jenny & Valasek, Justin Mattias, 2016. "The political economy of multilateral aid funds," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2016-303, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    6. Dreher, Axel & Simon, Jenny & Valasek, Justin, 2018. "The Political Economy of Multilateral Aid Funds," CEPR Discussion Papers 13297, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Gianmarco Daniele & Amedeo Piolatto & Willem Sas, 2020. "Does the Winner Take It All? Redistributive Policies and Political Extremism," Working Papers 1157, Barcelona School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    supranational unions; efficiency; public goods; redistribution; federalism; legislative bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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