Decentralization and Natural Disasters
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Michael R. Greenberg & Marc D. Weiner, 2014. "Pain of Sustainability: Limiting the Number of Times Homeowners Can Receive Disaster Relief," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 6(7), pages 1-17, July.
- Tanvir Pavel & Pallab Mozumder, 2019. "Household Preferences for Managing Coastal Vulnerability: State vs. Federal Adaptation Fund," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 281-304, October.
- Meri Davlasheridze & Qing Miao, 2021. "Natural disasters, public housing, and the role of disaster aid," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(5), pages 1113-1135, November.
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More about this item
Keywords
natural disasters; decentralization; risk-sharing; redistributive transfers; federalism; intergovernmental relations; grants;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
- H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
- R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
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