IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_3168.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Is there a Green Paradox?

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Hoel

Abstract

A sufficiently rapidly rising carbon tax may increase near-term emissions compared with the case of no carbon tax. Even so, such a carbon tax path may reduce total costs related to climate change, since the tax may reduce total carbon extraction. A government cannot commit to a specific carbon tax rate in the distant future. For reasonable assumptions about expectation formation, a higher present carbon tax will reduce near-term carbon emissions. Moreover, whatever the expectations about future tax rates are, near-term emissions will decline for a sufficiently high carbon tax. However, if the near-term tax rate for some reason is set below its optimal level, increased concern for the climate may change taxes in a manner that increases near-term emissions.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Hoel, 2010. "Is there a Green Paradox?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3168, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3168
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3168.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "Is there really a green paradox?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 342-363.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stefano Bosi & David Desmarchelier, 2016. "Are the Laffer curve and the Green Paradox mutually exclusive?," Working Papers hal-04141602, HAL.
    2. Anton Nakov & Carlos Thomas, 2023. "Climate-conscious monetary policy," Working Papers 2334, Banco de España.
    3. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2010. "The carbon-budget approach to climate stabilization: Cost-effective subglobal versus global action," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 143-10, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    4. Gustav Engström & Johan Gars, 2016. "Climatic Tipping Points and Optimal Fossil-Fuel Use," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(3), pages 541-571, November.
    5. Pauli Lappi & Markku Ollikainen, 2019. "Optimal Environmental Policy for a Mine Under Polluting Waste Rocks and Stock Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(1), pages 133-158, May.
    6. Konrad, Kai A. & Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 2021. "Effective climate policy needs non-combustion uses for hydrocarbons," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    7. Zhao, Xing & Guo, Yifan & Feng, Tianchu, 2023. "Towards green recovery: Natural resources utilization efficiency under the impact of environmental information disclosure," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    8. Hart, Rob & Spiro, Daniel, 2011. "The elephant in Hotelling's room," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(12), pages 7834-7838.
    9. Strand, Jon, 2013. "Strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement: Carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 202-218.
    10. Jussila Hammes, Johanna, 2011. "Path dependence: Biofuels policy under uncertainty about greenhouse gas emissions," Working Papers 2011:1, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI).
    11. Hendrik Ritter & Mark Schopf, 2014. "Unilateral Climate Policy: Harmful or Even Disastrous?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 58(1), pages 155-178, May.
    12. Aune, Finn Roar & Grimsrud, Kristine & Lindholt, Lars & Rosendahl, Knut Einar & Storrøsten, Halvor Briseid, 2017. "Oil consumption subsidy removal in OPEC and other Non-OECD countries: Oil market impacts and welfare effects," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 395-409.
    13. Xu, Hao & Xu, Jingxuan & Wang, Jie & Hou, Xiang, 2023. "Reduce production or increase efficiency? Hazardous air pollutants regulation, energy use, and the synergistic effect on industrial enterprises' carbon emission," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    14. Dao, Nguyen Thang & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2018. "Feldstein meets George: Land rent taxation and socially optimal allocation in economies with environmental externality," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 20-41.
    15. Jin, Wei & Shi, Xunpeng & Zhang, Lin, 2021. "Energy transition without dirty capital stranding," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    16. Strand, Jon, 2016. "Mitigation incentives with climate finance and treaty options," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 166-174.
    17. Bahel, Eric & Marrouch, Walid & Gaudet, Gérard, 2013. "The economics of oil, biofuel and food commodities," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 599-617.
    18. Durmaz, Tunç, 2018. "The economics of CCS: Why have CCS technologies not had an international breakthrough?," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 328-340.
    19. Hoel, Michael & Jensen, Svenn, 2012. "Cutting costs of catching carbon—Intertemporal effects under imperfect climate policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 680-695.
    20. Yingbin Zhou & Siqi Lv & Jianlin Wang & Junbo Tong & Zhong Fang, 2022. "The Impact of Green Taxes on the Carbon Emission Efficiency of China’s Construction Industry," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-18, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    climate change; exhaustible resources; green paradox; carbon tax;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3168. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.