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Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator

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  • Anne van Aaken
  • Lars P. Feld
  • Stefan Voigt

Abstract

It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne van Aaken & Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator," CESifo Working Paper Series 2245, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2245
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anne van Aaken & Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt, "undated". "The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003-1-1062, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    2. Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages 632-652, November.
    3. Anne Van Aaken & Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt, 2004. "The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch -- A Conceptual Framework," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 261-280, September.
    4. Feld, Lars P. & Voigt, Stefan, 2003. "Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527, September.
    5. Danila Serra, 2006. "Empirical determinants of corruption: A sensitivity analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 225-256, January.
    6. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Garoupa, Nuno, 2009. "Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-28, March.
    2. Kodila Tedika, Oasis, 2012. "Empirical Survey on the Causes of the Corruption [Aperçu empirique sur les causes de la corruption]," MPRA Paper 41484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Stefan Voigt & Lorenz Blume, 2007. "Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält – Ursachen und Folgen korrupter Justizbehörden," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8(1), pages 65-92, January.
    4. Lorenz Blume & Jens Müller & Stefan Voigt, 2009. "The economic effects of direct democracy—a first global assessment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 431-461, September.
    5. Jeffrey B. Nugent, 2014. "Detecting Corruption And Evaluating Programs To Control It: Some Lessons For Mena," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Ishac Diwan (ed.), UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS, chapter 7, pages 131-163, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya, 2015. "Fighting corruption or elections? The politics of anti-corruption policies in India: A subnational study," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 1035-1052.
    7. CHEN, Xuezheng & GUI, Lin & WU, Tao & ZHANG, Jun, 2024. "A theory of symbiotic corruption," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 478-494.
    8. Giuseppe Albanese & Marco M. Sorge, 2012. "The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision‐Making Process," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 1-23, March.
    9. Graf Lambsdorff, Johann, 2005. "Consequences and causes of corruption: What do we know from a cross-section of countries?," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-34-05, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    10. François Bourguignon & Boris Pleskovic, 2007. "Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics--Regional 2007 : Beyond Transition," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6679.
    11. Ulrich Thiessen, 2010. "The Shadow Economy in International Comparison: Options for Economic Policy Derived from an OECD Panel Analysis," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 481-509.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; prosecution agencies; judicial independence and positive constitutional economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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