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On the relationship between corruption and migration: empirical evidence from a gravity model of migration

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  • Marie Poprawe

Abstract

This paper shows the relationship between corruption and migration. In particular, countries with much corruption are shown to encourage emigration and discourage immigration because they provide worse and unpredictable economic conditions, more insecurity, and a lower quality of life. This hypothesis is confirmed empirically with a cross-sectional dataset with bilateral migration data covering 230 countries. Well-known implications of the gravity model are confirmed here: larger populations, a common language and a common border increase migration, while distance between two countries decreases migration. Furthermore, education, GDP per capita, inflation in the destination country, as well as corruption and education in the origin country can robustly explain migration. Corruption thus appears to be a push factor of migration. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Marie Poprawe, 2015. "On the relationship between corruption and migration: empirical evidence from a gravity model of migration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(3), pages 337-354, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:163:y:2015:i:3:p:337-354
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-015-0255-x
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Migration; Gravity model; F22; D73;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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