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An Economic Rationale for Public Education: The Value of Commitment

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  • Mark Gradstein

Abstract

This paper offers an explanation for the widespread phenomenon of uniform public schooling, which is viewed here as a way for the government to precommit itself to restraints on future income redistribution. Such precommitment is likely to enhance accumulation of human capital, to bolster economic growth, and, under certain circumstances, to constitu te a preferred choice for a majority of voters.

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  • Mark Gradstein, 1999. "An Economic Rationale for Public Education: The Value of Commitment," CESifo Working Paper Series 209, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_209
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    Cited by:

    1. Tetsuo Ono & Yuki Uchida, 2018. "Capital Income Taxation, Economic Growth, and the Politics of Public Education," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 18-05, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    2. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka, 2005. "A Case for Taxing Education," CESifo Working Paper Series 1440, CESifo.
    3. Nikos Benos, 2005. "Education Systems, Growth and Welfare," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2005, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    4. Joachim Jickeli, 2001. "The Role of Markets and Government in Human-Capital Building and Education: A Research Program in Institutional Economics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(1), pages 87-107, March.
    5. Catalin Dragomirescu-Gaina, 2015. "An empirical inquiry into the determinants of public education spending in Europe," IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-24, December.
    6. Amedeo Piolatto, 2011. "Financing public education: a political economy model with altruistic agents and retirement concerns," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-12, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    7. Gradstein, Mark & Justman, Moshe, 2000. "Human capital, social capital, and public schooling," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 879-890, May.
    8. Alessandro Balestrino & Lisa Grazzini & Annalisa Luporini, 2021. "On the political economy of compulsory education," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(1), pages 1-25, September.
    9. Konrad, Kai A. & Andersson, Fredrik, 2001. "Globalization and Human Capital Formation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2657, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Gradstein, Mark, 2019. "Misallocation of Talent and Human Capital: Political Economy Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 13574, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka, 2008. "A case for taxing education," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(2), pages 145-163, April.
    12. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1539-1555, August.
    13. Gradstein, Mark, 2010. "Social Insurance, Education, and Work Ethics," CEPR Discussion Papers 7838, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Gradstein, Mark, 2019. "Misallocation of talent and human capital: Political economy analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 148-157.
    15. Thum, Claudio & Uebelmesser, Silke, 2003. "Mobility and the Role of Education as a Commitment Device," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(5), pages 549-564, September.
    16. Nikos Benos, 2004. "Education Policies and Economic Growth," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 4-2004, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    17. Lu, Chia-Hui, 2018. "Social status, compulsory education, and growth," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 425-434.
    18. Soares, Jorge, 2003. "Self-interest and public funding of education," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 703-727, March.
    19. Amihai Glazer & Mark Gradstein, 2001. "Appropriation, Human Capital, and Mandatory Schooling," CESifo Working Paper Series 538, CESifo.
    20. Daniel Montolio (University of Barcelona (UB) and Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)) & Amedeo Piolatto (University of Barcelona (UB) and Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)), 2011. "Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns," Working Papers in Economics 268, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    21. Daniel Montolio & Amedeo Piolatto & Luca Salvadori, 2022. "Financing public education when agents have retirement concerns," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(4), pages 1559-1580, October.
    22. Nikos Benos, 2005. "Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from OECD," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 1-2005, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.

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