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Capital taxation and electoral accountability

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  • Aidt, Toke S.
  • Magris, Francesco

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of performance voting in solving the capital levy problem. In a representative democracy, voters can use elections to protect their property by holding politicians accountable for the tax policies they implement. We characterize the set of tax policies that can be sustained by symmetric performance standards and show when this set contains the second best (Ramsey) tax policy.
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  • Aidt, Toke S. & Magris, Francesco, 2006. "Capital taxation and electoral accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 277-291, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:22:y:2006:i:2:p:277-291
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    Cited by:

    1. Aidt, Toke S. & Magris, Francesco, 2006. "Capital taxation and electoral accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 277-291, June.
    2. Ismael Issifou & Francesco Magris, 2017. "Migration outflows and optimal migration policy: rules versus discretion," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 16(2), pages 87-112, August.
    3. Dalibor Eterovic, 2009. "Policy Reform Under Electoral Uncertainty," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 546, Central Bank of Chile.
    4. Magris, Francesco & Russo, Giuseppe, 2016. "Fiscal Revenues and Commitment in Immigration Amnesties," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 75-90.
    5. Toke S. Aidt & Jayasri Dutta, 2017. "Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(1), pages 38-58, February.
    6. Aidt, Toke S. & Dutta, Jayasri, 2004. "Strategic consensus," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 227-245, June.
    7. Aidt, Toke S. & Dutta, Jayasri, 2007. "Policy myopia and economic growth," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 734-753, September.
    8. Dalibor S. Eterovic, 2011. "Institutional Bias towards the Status Quo," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(3), pages 489-514, September.
    9. Aidt, T.S. & Dutta, J., 2008. "Electoral Uncertainty and Public Goods," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0843, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    10. Eric Borgne & Ben Lockwood, 2006. "Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning vs. Re-Election Concerns," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 41-60, October.
    11. Toke S. Aidt & Jayasri Dutta, 2017. "Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(1), pages 38-58, February.
    12. Oskar Nupia, 2017. "Income Taxes, Political Accountability and Public Goods Provision," Documentos CEDE 15835, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    13. Jie Ma, 2017. "Double-edged incentive competition for foreign direct investment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(2), pages 282-312, April.
    14. Toke A. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz, 2007. "An Economic Theory of Political Institutions: Foreign Intervention and Overseas Investments," Discussion Papers 07-03, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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