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Private Provision of a Complementary Public Good

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  • Richard Schmidtke

Abstract

For several years, an increasing number of firms have been investing in Open Source Software (OSS). While improvements in such a non-excludable public good cannot be appropriated, companies can benefit indirectly in a complementary proprietary segment. We study this incentive for investment in OSS. In particular we ask how (1) market entry and (2) public investments in the public good affect the firms' production and profits. Surprisingly, we find that there exist cases where incumbents benefit from market entry. Moreover, we show the counter-intuitive result that public spending does not necessarily lead to a decreasing voluntary private contribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Schmidtke, 2006. "Private Provision of a Complementary Public Good," CESifo Working Paper Series 1756, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1756
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Some Simple Economics of Open Source," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 197-234, June.
    2. Justin Pappas Johnson, 2002. "Open Source Software: Private Provision of a Public Good," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(4), pages 637-662, December.
    3. Schmidt, Klaus & Schnitzer, Monika, 2003. "Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 3793, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Economides, Nicholas, 1996. "Network externalities, complementarities, and invitations to enter," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 211-233, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bottai, Carlo, 2015. "Open Innovation in a Model à la Hotelling," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201526, University of Turin.
    2. Karamollah Bagherifard & Mohsen Rahmani & Vahid Rafe & Mehrbakhsh Nilashi, 2018. "A Recommendation Method Based on Semantic Similarity and Complementarity Using Weighted Taxonomy: A Case on Construction Materials Dataset," Journal of Information & Knowledge Management (JIKM), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 17(01), pages 1-26, March.
    3. Heijdra, Ben J. & Ligthart, Jenny E., 2007. "Fiscal policy, monopolistic competition, and finite lives," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 325-359, January.
    4. Gauguier, Jean-Jacques, 2009. "L’industrialisation de l’Open Source," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/4388 edited by Toledano, Joëlle.
    5. Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Gastón Llanes, 2011. "Mixed Source," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(7), pages 1212-1230, July.
    6. Llanes, Gastón & de Elejalde, Ramiro, 2013. "Industry equilibrium with open-source and proprietary firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 36-49.
    7. Luigi Balletta & Antonio Tesoriere, 2020. "Cumulative innovation, open source, and distance to frontier," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(6), pages 1875-1920, December.
    8. Sebastian von Engelhardt, 2010. "Quality Competition or Quality Cooperation? License-Type and the Strategic Nature of Open Source vs. Closed Source Business Models," Jena Economics Research Papers 2010-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Open Source Software; private provision of public goods; Cournot-Nash equilibrium; complements; market entry;
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