Adverse Selection in an Insurance Market with Government-Guaranteed Subsistence Levels
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Bum J. Kim & Harris Schlesinger, 2005. "Adverse Selection in an Insurance Market With Government‐Guaranteed Subsistence Levels," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 72(1), pages 61-75, March.
References listed on IDEAS
- MOSSIN, Jan, 1968. "Aspects of rational insurance purchasing," LIDAM Reprints CORE 23, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
- Kaplow, Louis, 1991.
"Incentives and Government Relief for Risk,"
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 167-175, April.
- Louis Kaplow, 1989. "Incentives and Government Relief for Risk," NBER Working Papers 3007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
- Hajime Miyazaki, 1977. "The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 394-418, Autumn.
- Shavell, S., 1986. "The judgment proof problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-58, June.
- Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Tatyana Deryugina & Barrett Kirwan, 2018.
"Does The Samaritan'S Dilemma Matter? Evidence From U.S. Agriculture,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 983-1006, April.
- Tatyana Deryugina & Barrett Kirwan, 2016. "Does The Samaritan's Dilemma Matter? Evidence From U.S. Agriculture," NBER Working Papers 22845, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marielle Brunette & Laure Cabantous & Stéphane Couture & Anne Stenger, 2013. "The impact of governmental assistance on insurance demand under ambiguity: a theoretical model and an experimental test," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 153-174, August.
- Paul Raschky & Reimund Schwarze & Manijeh Schwindt & Ferdinand Zahn, 2013.
"Uncertainty of Governmental Relief and the Crowding out of Flood Insurance,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 54(2), pages 179-200, February.
- Paul A. Raschky & Reimund Schwarze & Manijeh Schwindt & Ferdinand Zahn, "undated". "Uncertainty of Governmental Relief and the Crowding out of Insurance," Working Papers 2010-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Paul A. Raschky & Reimund Schwarze & Manijeh Schwindt & Ferdinand Zahn, 2010. "Uncertainty of Governmental Relief and the Crowding out of Insurance," Monash Economics Working Papers 05-10, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Meri Davlasheridze & Qing Miao, 2019. "Does Governmental Assistance Affect Private Decisions to Insure? An Empirical Analysis of Flood Insurance Purchases," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 95(1), pages 124-145.
- Franz Sinabell & Thomas Url, 2006. "Versicherungen als effizientes Mittel zur Risikotragung von Naturgefahren," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 28181, January.
- Brunette, Marielle & Couture, Stéphane, 2008.
"Public compensation for windstorm damage reduces incentives for risk management investments,"
Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(7-8), pages 491-499, October.
- Marielle Brunette & Stéphane Couture, 2008. "Public compensation for windstorm damage reduces incentives for risk management investments," Post-Print hal-00278718, HAL.
- Marielle Brunette & Stephane Couture, 2007. "Effects of Public Compensation for Disaster Damages on Private Insurance and Forest Management Decisions," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2007-06, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA.
- M. Brunette & S. Couture & J. Foncel & S. Garcia, 2020. "The decision to insure against forest fire risk: an econometric analysis combining hypothetical real data," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 45(1), pages 111-133, January.
- Paul Raschky & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, 2007. "Charity hazard - A real hazard to natural disaster insurance," Working Papers 2007-04, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Ming Chang & Chiu Lin & Dachrahn Wu, 2008. "Piracy and limited liability," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 25-53, October.
- Amanda Savitt, 2017. "Insurance as a tool for hazard risk management? An evaluation of the literature," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 86(2), pages 583-599, March.
- Marielle Brunette & Stéphane Couture & Jérôme Foncel & Serge S. Garcia, 2017. "Insurance decision against forest fire : An econometric analysis combining experimental and real data," Post-Print hal-02785187, HAL.
- Mette Ejrnæs & Stefan Hochguertel, 2008. "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance: Empirical Evidence from a Large Administrative Sample," CAM Working Papers 2008-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
- Mette Ejrnaes & Stefan Hochguertel, 2008. "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-065/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 12 Aug 2011.
- Chen Yueyun & Hamwi Iskandar S., 2012. "Why Some Disaster Insurance Does not Exist," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-16, February.
- Drevs Florian & Nguyen Tristan, 2012. "Adverse Selektion light – Der Einfluss des Flat-Rate-Bias auf das Tarifwahlverhalten bei Krankenversicherungen / Adverse Selection Light – How can flat-rate bias influence insurance demand," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 63(1), pages 365-382, January.
- Kousky, Carolyn & Michel-Kerjan, Erwann O. & Raschky, Paul A., 2018. "Does federal disaster assistance crowd out flood insurance?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 150-164.
- Thomas Url, 2011. "Private Versicherungen als Finanzierungsquelle für den Pflegebedarf im Alter," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 41358, January.
- Marielle Brunette & Stéphane Couture & Serge S. Garcia, 2011. "Determinants of insurance demand against forest fire risk: Evidence from experimental and real world data," Post-Print hal-01191123, HAL.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Lisa L. Posey & Paul D. Thistle, 2019. "Large losses and equilibrium in insurance markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(2), pages 222-244, September.
- Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Henri Loubergé, 1998. "Risk and Insurance Economics 25 Years After," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 23(4), pages 540-567, October.
- Giuseppe, DE FEO & Jean, HINDRIKS, 2005.
"Efficiency of Competition in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection,"
Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques)
2005042, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- DE FEO, Giuseppe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2005. "Efficiency of competition in insurance markets with adverse selection," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Paweł Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2023.
"Redistribution with Performance Pay,"
Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(2), pages 371-402.
- Doligalski, Pawel & Ndiaye, Abdoulaye & Werquin, Nicolas, 2020. "Redistribution with Performance Pay," MPRA Paper 102652, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Doligalski, Pawel & Ndiaye, Abdoulaye & Werquin, Nicolas, 2022. "Redistribution with Performance Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 14648, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pawel Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2020. "Redistribution with Performance Pay," CESifo Working Paper Series 8267, CESifo.
- Doligalski, Pawel & Werquin, Nicolas & Ndiaye, Abdoulaye, 2020. "Redistribution with Performance Pay," TSE Working Papers 20-1092, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Pawel Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2020. "Redistribution with Performance Pay," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 20/721, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Posey, Lisa L. & Thistle, Paul D., 2021. "Genetic testing and genetic discrimination: Public policy when insurance becomes “too expensive”," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
- Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2020.
"The Social Costs of Side Trading,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(630), pages 1608-1622.
- Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2019. "The Social Costs of Side Trading," CEIS Research Paper 463, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 10 Jul 2019.
- Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2020. "The Social Costs of Side Trading," Working Papers hal-02538295, HAL.
- Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2019. "The Social Costs of Side Trading," TSE Working Papers 19-1017, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2019.
- Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2019. "The Social Costs of Side Trading," EconPol Working Paper 34, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
- Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2020. "The Social Costs of Side Trading," Post-Print hal-03048803, HAL.
- Mariotti, Thomas & Attar, Andrea & Salanié, François, 2019. "The Social Costs of Side Trading," CEPR Discussion Papers 13872, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated".
"Remedies for Sick Insurance,"
Working Papers
620, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Daniel L. McFadden & Carlos E. Noton & Pau Olivella, 2012. "Remedies for Sick Insurance," NBER Working Papers 17938, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2013. "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Documentos de Trabajo 302, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Georges Dionne & Casey G. Rothschild, 2011.
"Risk Classification in Insurance Contracting,"
Cahiers de recherche
1137, CIRPEE.
- Dionne, Georges & Rothschild, Casey, 2012. "Risk classification in insurance contracting," Working Papers 11-5, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Sebastian Soika, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Advantageous Selection in Private Disability Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(1), pages 97-125, January.
- Chu-Shiu Li & Chwen-Chi Liu & Chen-Sheng Yang, 2010. "Tax Deductions for Losses and Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 38(1), pages 51-63, March.
- Finkelstein, Amy & Poterba, James & Rothschild, Casey, 2009.
"Redistribution by insurance market regulation: Analyzing a ban on gender-based retirement annuities,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 38-58, January.
- Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba & Casey Rothschild, 2006. "Redistribution by Insurance Market Regulation: Analyzing a Ban on Gender-Based Retirement Annuities," NBER Working Papers 12205, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- De Feo, Giuseppe & Hindriks, Jean, 2014.
"Harmful competition in insurance markets,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 213-226.
- De Feo, Giuseppe & Hindriks, Jean, 2009. "Harmful competition in the insurance markets," SIRE Discussion Papers 2009-46, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- DE FEO, Giuseppe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2014. "Harmful competition in insurance markets," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2615, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Giuseppe De Feo & Jean Hindriks, 2009. "Harmful competition in the insurance markets," Working Papers 0921, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
- Giuseppe De Feo & Jean Hindriks, 2010. "Harmful Competition in the Insurance Markets," Working Papers 3_215, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno.
- Dietrich, Diemo & Gehrig, Thomas, 2021.
"Speculative and precautionary demand for liquidity in competitive banking markets,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
118869, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Dietrich, Diemo & Gehrig, Thomas, 2022. "Speculative and Precautionary Demand for Liquidity in Competitive Banking Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 15827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dietrich, Diemo & Gehrig, Thomas, 2021. "Speculative and Precautionary Demand for Liquidity in Competitive Banking Markets," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242347, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Torben M. Andersen, 2024. "Hedging mortality risk over the life‐cycle—The role of information and borrowing constraints," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(4), pages 1449-1466, October.
- Lisa L. Posey & Paul D. Thistle, 2017. "Automobile Insurance and Driver Ability: Contract Choice as a Screening Mechanism," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 42(2), pages 141-170, September.
- Wanda Mimra & Achim Wambach, 2011. "A Game-Theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series 3412, CESifo.
- Anastasios Dosis, 2016. "An Efficient Mechanism for Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection," Working Papers hal-01282772, HAL.
- Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, 2005. "Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 8(2), pages 211-237, September.
- Wanda Mimra & Achim Wambach, 2019. "Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(4), pages 875-907, June.
More about this item
Keywords
adverse selection; insurance; government relief;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IAS-2004-07-04 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2004-07-04 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-SEA-2004-07-04 (South East Asia)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1217. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.