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Central Bank Communication with the Polarized Public

Author

Listed:
  • Pei Kuang
  • Michael Weber
  • Shihan Xie
  • Michael Weber

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of political polarization on public trust in the Fed and its influence on macroeconomic expectations. Using a large-scale survey experiment which we fielded on President Trump’s 2025 inauguration day, we study how households form beliefs about the Fed regarding its political leaning, independence, and trustworthiness. Political alignment significantly shapes perceptions: individuals who view the Fed as politically aligned report higher independence of and trust in the Fed, leading to lower inflation expectations and uncertainty. Strategic communication on institutional structure and policy objectives effectively mitigates perception biases, reinforcing the Fed’s credibility and enhancing its policy effectivenes.

Suggested Citation

  • Pei Kuang & Michael Weber & Shihan Xie & Michael Weber, 2025. "Central Bank Communication with the Polarized Public," CESifo Working Paper Series 11708, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11708
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2024. "Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 425-457, June.
    2. Alan S. Blinder, 2000. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1421-1431, December.
    3. Coibion, Olivier & Gorodnichenko, Yuriy & Weber, Michael, 2020. "Political Polarization and Expected Economic Outcomes," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9h51c373, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    4. Binder, Carola Conces & Kamdar, Rupal & Ryngaert, Jane M., 2024. "Partisan expectations and COVID-era inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(S).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank communication; partisan; trust; expectations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E70 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation

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