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Reassignment and the Power to Tax in a Federal State: Canada, 1867-2024

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  • Stanley, L. Winter

Abstract

Although reassignment of policy instruments among governments in many federations is a recurring event, there is no widely accepted, positive model of the phenomenon. This stands in contrast to the well established body of work on the normative theory of the efficient federal assignment. In this paper, I study reassignment of the power to tax in the Canadian federation by considering three elements that are likely to be part of any complete, positive analysis. These are: the facts that characterize the fiscal history of reassignment in the Canadian federation; the logic behind the demand for tax and other instruments by provincial and national governments; and the analysis of intergovernmental trade in governing instruments, which adds the supply of instruments and closes the model. While the story I tell is constructed to deal with the Canadian case, I hope that some of the ideas and issues I raise will generalize.

Suggested Citation

  • Stanley, L. Winter, 2025. "Reassignment and the Power to Tax in a Federal State: Canada, 1867-2024," CESifo Working Paper Series 11678, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11678
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    federal constitution; reassignment; demand and supply of governing instruments; power to tax; political competition; fiscal history; Canadian fiscal federalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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