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Donor-Determined Intergovernmental Grants Structure

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  • Dennis Patrick Leyden

    (University of North Carolina at Greensboro)

Abstract

The lack of simple language to describe the structure of intergovernmental grant programs and a failure to recognize that such programs are chosen by legislators whose preferences differ from those of recipients has led to an inability to develop a theory of why intergovernmental grants exist and why grant programs take the forms that they do. By reducing the complexities of grant programs to a simple structure of rates, bases, and purposes, this article is able to provide a conceptual framework for viewing individual grant programs as components of a comprehensive intergovernmental grants structure chosen through a legislative process in which individual legislators have preferences that are distinct from those of their recipients. Administrative costs play an important role in keeping the resulting grants structure simple, and the existence of categorical grants is shown to depend on the existence of spillover effects, fiscal illusion, or political asymmetry.

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis Patrick Leyden, 1992. "Donor-Determined Intergovernmental Grants Structure," Public Finance Review, , vol. 20(3), pages 321-337, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:321-337
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219202000303
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Maria El Khdari, 2019. "Déterminants des transferts intergouvernementaux : le cas du Maroc," Post-Print hal-02137651, HAL.
    3. Maria EL KHDARI, 2015. "Déterminants des transferts intergouvernementaux : le cas des communes Marocaines," Working Papers 201531, CERDI.
    4. Emilie Caldeira, 2012. "Does the System of Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers in Senegal Eliminate Politically Motivated Targeting?," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 21(2), pages 167-191, March.
    5. Worthington, Andrew C & Dollery, Brian E, 1998. "The Political Determination of Intergovernmental Grants in Australia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 299-315, March.
    6. Khemani, Stuti, 2003. "Partisan politics and intergovernmental transfers in India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3016, The World Bank.
    7. Fredrik Carlsen, 1998. "Central Regulation of Local Authorities," Public Finance Review, , vol. 26(4), pages 304-326, July.
    8. Campbell, Colin D. & Fischel, William A., 1996. "Preferences for School Finance Systems: Voters Versus Judges," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 49(1), pages 1-15, March.

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