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Gambling for Re-election

Author

Listed:
  • Alastair Langtry
  • Niklas Potrafke
  • Marcel Schlepper
  • Timo Wochner

Abstract

This paper presents novel empirical evidence that gambling style behaviour – which has been documented in many areas of economic decision-making – is important in politics. We show that politicians ‘gamble for re-election’ in the context of a political leader selection. To overcome challenges arising from secret ballots, we exploit unique access to leaked information on MPs’ individual decisions in a de facto vote for the 2021 leadership election of Germany’s centre-right parties. MPs are more likely to vote for a riskier candidate when faced with tougher re-election races in their constituency. Quantitatively, a 10 pp. decrease in the probability to be re-elected is associated with a 2.9 pp. increase in the likelihood to vote for the riskier candidate. These results match the predictions derived from our model of rational risk-taking. Gambling for re-election provides a new explanation for intra-party dissent and rationalises why parties may choose low quality leaders when better ones are available.

Suggested Citation

  • Alastair Langtry & Niklas Potrafke & Marcel Schlepper & Timo Wochner, 2024. "Gambling for Re-election," CESifo Working Paper Series 11125, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11125
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    risk-taking; politicians’ behaviour; political leader selection; intra-party competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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