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Do Distressed Banks Really Gamble for Resurrection?

Author

Listed:
  • Ben-David, Itzhak

    (Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER))

  • Palvia, Ajay A.

    (Government of the United States of America - Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC))

  • Stulz, Rene M.

    (Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI))

Abstract

We explore the actions of financially distressed banks in two distinct periods that include financial crises (1985-1994, 2005-2014) and differ in bank regulations, especially concerning capital requirements and enforcement. In contrast to the widespread belief that distressed banks gamble for resurrection, we document that distressed banks take actions to reduce leverage and risk, such as reducing asset and loan growth, issuing equity, decreasing dividends, and lowering deposit rates. Despite large differences in regulation between periods, the extent of deleveraging is similar, suggesting that economic forces beyond formal regulations incentivize bank managers to deleverage when their banks are in distress.

Suggested Citation

  • Ben-David, Itzhak & Palvia, Ajay A. & Stulz, Rene M., 2019. "Do Distressed Banks Really Gamble for Resurrection?," Working Paper Series 2019-10, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:ohidic:2019-10
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    Cited by:

    1. Frey, Rainer & Weth, Mark Andreas, 2019. "Banks' holdings of risky sovereign bonds in the absence of the nexus: Yield seeking with central bank funding or de-risking?," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203537, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Hristov, Nikolay & Hülsewig, Oliver & Kolb, Benedikt, 2024. "Macroprudential capital regulation and fiscal balances in the euro area," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    3. Patel, Ajay & Sorokina, Nonna & Thornton, John H., 2022. "Liquidity and bank capital structure," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    4. Alastair Langtry & Niklas Potrafke & Marcel Schlepper & Timo Wochner, 2024. "Gambling for Re-election," CESifo Working Paper Series 11125, CESifo.
    5. Peter Koudijs & Laura Salisbury & Gurpal Sran, 2021. "For Richer, for Poorer: Bankers' Liability and Bank Risk in New England, 1867 to 1880," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(3), pages 1541-1599, June.
    6. Palvia, Ajay & Vähämaa, Emilia & Vähämaa, Sami, 2020. "Female leadership and bank risk-taking: Evidence from the effects of real estate shocks on bank lending performance and default risk," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 897-909.
    7. Bischof, Jannis & Laux, Christian & Leuz, Christian, 2021. "Accounting for financial stability: Bank disclosure and loss recognition in the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(3), pages 1188-1217.
    8. Bischof, Jannis & Laux, Christian & Leuz, Christian, 2020. "Accounting for financial stability: Lessons from the financial crisis and future challenges," SAFE Working Paper Series 283, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    9. Martijn Boermans & Bram van der Kroft, 2020. "Capital regulation induced reaching for systematic yield: Financial instability through fire sales," Working Papers 673, DNB.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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