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Equilibria in Multi-unit Auctions

Author

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  • Michal Bresky

Abstract

The paper shows the existence of a pure strategy Nash equlibrium for a general class of multi-unit auctions. The seller offers k identical units of goods and sets the minimum accepted bid (reservation price). Any bidder has an arbitrary distribution of values for the units on which they submit up to k bids. The class of games includes uniform-price, pay-your-bid, all-pay and Vickery auction as polar cases. The conditions for the existence of a pure weakly increasing strategy equlibrium are specified, and the essential equilibrium properties are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Michal Bresky, 1999. "Equilibria in Multi-unit Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp145, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    • Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp145
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    File URL: http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp145.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2003. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 395-409, November.
    2. Raphael Calel, 2010. "Auctioning conservation contracts in thepresence of externalities," GRI Working Papers 22, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    3. Han, Seungjin, 2013. "Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2068-2095.
    4. McAdams, David, 2002. "Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions," Working papers 4254-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    5. Michal Bresky, 2008. "Properties of Equilibrium Strategies in Multiple-Unit, Uniform-Price Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp354, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    6. Wiroy Shin, 2013. "Simultaneous auctions for complementary goods," Papers 1312.2641, arXiv.org.
    7. Michal Bresky, 2008. "Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp376, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-unit auction; multiple-object auction; existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games; all-pay; pay-your-bid and uniform-price auction with reservation price.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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