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The Growth of Psychometric Testing for Selection Why Has Test Use Increased,Will Growth Continue, and What Does This Mean for Education?

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  • Andrew Jenkins
  • Alison Wolf

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  • Andrew Jenkins & Alison Wolf, 2002. "The Growth of Psychometric Testing for Selection Why Has Test Use Increased,Will Growth Continue, and What Does This Mean for Education?," CEE Discussion Papers 0029, Centre for the Economics of Education, LSE.
    • Handle: RePEc:cep:ceedps:0029
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    File URL: https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cee/CEEDP29.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    2. Pryor,Frederic L. & Schaffer,David L., 1999. "Who's Not Working and Why," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521651523, October.
    3. Jenkins, Andrew & Wolf, Alison, 2002. "Why do employers use selection tests? Evidence from British workplaces," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19503, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Avinash Dixit, 2002. "# Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 696-727.
    5. Andrew Jenkins, 2001. "Companies use of psychometric testing and the changing demand for skills: A review of the literature," CEE Discussion Papers 0012, Centre for the Economics of Education, LSE.
    6. Andrew Jenkins & Alison Wolf, 2002. "Why Do Employers Use Selection Tests? Evidence from British Workplaces," CEE Discussion Papers 0027, Centre for the Economics of Education, LSE.
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