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Repensando os jogos de política econômica com governos sinceramente estabilizadores

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  • William Ricardo de Sá

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  • William Ricardo de Sá, 1998. "Repensando os jogos de política econômica com governos sinceramente estabilizadores," Textos para Discussão Cedeplar-UFMG td122, Cedeplar, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdp:texdis:td122
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    File URL: https://www.cedeplar.ufmg.br/pesquisas/td/TD%20122.pdf
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    1. Carlos H. Acuña & William C. Smith, 1996. "The political logic of support and opposition to neoliberal reform," Nova Economia, Economics Department, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Brazil), vol. 6(1), pages 9-50, July.
    2. Cukierman, Alex & Liviatan, Nissan, 1992. "The Dynamics of Optimal Gradual Stabilizations," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 439-458, September.
    3. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1987. "A Game-Theoretical Interpretation of Inflation and Unemployment in Western Europe," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(3), pages 227-257, July.
    4. Gordon, Robert J, 1975. "The Demand for and Supply of Inflation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 807-836, December.
    5. Sargent, Thomas J. & Wallace, Neil, 1976. "Rational expectations and the theory of economic policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 169-183, April.
    6. Bruno, Michael, 1989. "Econometrics and the Design of Economic Reform," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 275-306, March.
    7. Banks,Jeffrey S. & Hanushek,Eric Allen (ed.), 1995. "Modern Political Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521472333, October.
    8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    9. Soskice, David, 1990. "Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized Countries," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 6(4), pages 36-61, Winter.
    10. Hibbs, Douglas A., 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1467-1487, December.
    11. Kiguel, Miguel A & Liviatan, Nissan, 1992. "When Do Heterodox Stabilization Programs Work? Lessons from Experience," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 7(1), pages 35-57, January.
    12. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    13. Banks,Jeffrey S. & Hanushek,Eric Allen (ed.), 1995. "Modern Political Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521478106, October.
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