On the outside-option principle with one-sided options
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- Watson, Joel, 2020. "On the outside-option principle with one-sided options," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Economics; Applied Economics; Economic Theory; Near-efficient outside options; Bargaining games; Negotiation; Bargaining solutions; The hold-up problem;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2022-05-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2022-05-16 (Microeconomics)
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