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General equilibrium in vertical market structures: monopoly, monopsony, predatory behavior and the law

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  • Just, Richard E.
  • Rausser, Gordon C.

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  • Just, Richard E. & Rausser, Gordon C., 2007. "General equilibrium in vertical market structures: monopoly, monopsony, predatory behavior and the law," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt8bc979mb, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt8bc979mb
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard E, Just & Darrell L. Heuth & Andrew Schmitz, 2004. "The Welfare Economics of Public Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3342.
    2. Roger G. Noll, 2005. ""Buyer Power" and Economic Policy," Discussion Papers 04-008, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard E. Just & Gordon C. Rausser, 2007. "General Equilibrium in Vertical Market Structures: Overselling Versus Overbuying," Research in Law and Economics, in: Research in Law and Economics, pages 149-181, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

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