Moral Hazard In A Principal-Agent(S) Team
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974.
"Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "Incentives and Risk-Sharing in Sharecropping," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 353, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Carmichael, H Lorne, 1983. "The Agent-Agents Problem: Payment by Relative Output," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 50-65, January.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Shasikanta Nandeibam, 1994. "A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 227-250, December.
- Roussey, Ludivine & Soubeyran, Raphael, 2018.
"Overburdened judges,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 21-32.
- Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018. "Overburdened judges," Post-Print hal-02621924, HAL.
- Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018. "Overburdened judges," Working Papers halshs-01936006, HAL.
- Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018. "Overburdened judges," CEE-M Working Papers halshs-01936006, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
- Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018. "Overburdened judges," Working Papers hal-02791013, HAL.
- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018.
"Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions,"
Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," Working Papers 883, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5851, CESifo.
- Demougin, Dominique & Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994.
"Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-231, October.
- Dominique Demougin & Hans-Werner Sinn, 1992. "Privatization, Risk-Taking and the Communist Firm," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9216, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Demougin, Dominique & Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1993. "Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 743, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Demougin, Dominique & Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994. "Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm," Munich Reprints in Economics 20039, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Hans-Werner Sinn & Dominique Demougin, 1992. "Privatization, Risk Taking and the Communist Firm," CESifo Working Paper Series 16, CESifo.
- Dominique Demougin & Hans-Werner Sinn, 1992. "Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm," NBER Working Papers 4205, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:789-848 is not listed on IDEAS
- Segerson, Kathleen, 1988.
"Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
- Segerson, Kathleen, 1985. "Uncertainty And Incentives For Nonpoint Pollution Control," 1985 Annual Meeting, August 4-7, Ames, Iowa 278615, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Edward P. Lazear, 1986. "Incentive Contracts," NBER Working Papers 1917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kathleen Segerson, 1986.
"Risk Sharing in the Design of Environmental Policy,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 68(5), pages 1261-1265.
- Segerson, Kathleen, 1986. "Risk-Sharing in the Design of Environmental Policy," 1986 Annual Meeting, July 27-30, Reno, Nevada 278154, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Innes, Robert, 1986. "Moral Hazard and the Genesis of Farm Debt," CUDARE Working Papers 198349, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Leon Zolotoy & Don O’Sullivan & Geoffrey P. Martin, 2022. "Behavioural Agency and Firm Productivity: Revisiting the Incentive Alignment Qualities of Stock Options," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(7), pages 1756-1787, November.
- Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, 1998. "Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision," NBER Working Papers 6544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sirmans, G. Stacy & Sirmans, C. F. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1999. "Prices, incentives and choice of management form," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 173-195, March.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1987. "Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(1), pages 5-24.
- Ng, Yew-Kwang & Shi, He-ling, 1995. "Work quality and optimal pay structure: Piece vs. hourly rates in employee remuneration," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(3-4), pages 409-416, March.
- Gaarder, Marie M. & Bartsch, Ulrich, 2014. "The second wave of independence : shopping for solutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7069, The World Bank.
- Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.
- David E. M. Sappington, 1991. "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 45-66, Spring.
- Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2017. "Gaming modeling of self-enforcing agreements and free-rider problem," MPRA Paper 80818, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- John J. McCall, 1982. "Introduction to "The Economics of Information and Uncertainty"," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages -11, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fleckinger, Pierre & Martimort, David & Roux, Nicolas, 2023. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," TSE Working Papers 23-1421, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2024.
- Nur, Suardi & Burton, Bruce & Bergmann, Ariel, 2023. "Evidence on optimal risk allocation models for Indonesian geothermal projects under PPP contracts," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sanjeev Sharma (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cdudein.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.