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Introduction To The Semantics Of Belief And Common Belief

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  • Giacomo Bonanno
  • Klaus Nehring

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract

We provide an introduction to interactive belief systems from a qualitative and semantic point of view. Properties of belief hierarchies are formulated locally. Among the properties considered are ""Common belief in no error"" (which has been shown to have important game theoretic applications), ""Negative introspection of common belief"" and ""Truth about common belief."" The relationship between these properties is studied.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Introduction To The Semantics Of Belief And Common Belief," Working Papers 191, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:191
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stalnaker, Robert, 1996. "Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 133-163, October.
    2. Bonanno, Giacomo & Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 3-29, July.
    3. Lismont L. & Mongin, P., 1996. "Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 60-60, February.
    4. LISMONT, Luc & MONGIN, Philippe, 1994. "On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994005, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
    6. John Geanakoplos, 1992. "Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 53-82, Fall.
    7. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1992. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275567, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    8. Ben-Porath, E., 1992. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games," Papers 14-92, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
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