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Does Income Inequality enter into an Aggregate Model of Voter Turnout? Evidence from Canada and Indian States

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Abstract

Conflict theory argues that greater income inequality induces greater political and electoral participation. Relative power theory argues that greater inequality leads to political alienation and electoral disengagement. We test these alternatives on time series data by entering the Gini coefficient into an aggregate model of electoral participation in Canada. While ordinary least squares (OLS) results suggest that income inequality is inversely related to voter turnout, time series considerations raise the possibility that this result is spurious. Correction using a linear autoregressive distribution lag (ARDL) model finds no evidence of a relationship, but nonparametric modeling suggests an inverted U-shaped shape that is captured quadratically within the ARDL model. Additional support is found when the nonlinearity hypothesis is tested on a panel of Indian states. Together the results are consistent with the hypothesis that conflict theory operates at low levels of income inequality before growing inequality leads to voter alienation and lower turnouts consistent with relative power theory.

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  • J. Stephen Ferris & Bharatee Bhusana Dash & Marcel-Cristian Voia, 2021. "Does Income Inequality enter into an Aggregate Model of Voter Turnout? Evidence from Canada and Indian States," Carleton Economic Papers 21-09, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:21-09
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    1. J. Stephen Ferris & Bharatee Bhusana Dash, 2023. "Does a swing voter model with voter turnout reflect the closeness of the Indian state elections: 1957 - 2018?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(6), pages 594-602, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voter turnout; income inequality; Canadian time series and ARDL modeling; Indian state panel data; nonlinear relationships.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

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